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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION -AND- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union of America
Local 100

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issues are:
1. Did the Company violate the contract
in connection with the vacation pay
of Raymond Miller? If so, what shall
be the remedy?
2. The grievance of Riccardo Thompson,
claiming that he was forced to resign
"under duress and intimidation."
A hearing was held on June 10, 1987 at which time Messrs.
Miller and Thompson and representatives of the above-named Union
and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full oppor-

tunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

During the relevant vacation year, grievant Miller worked
approximately the first half as an express bus driver, and the
remainder as a Board of Education driver.

Following the latter

he returned to express bus driving.
He received vacation pay only for the the time spent as an
express bus driver.
It is undisputed that the year before he worked the same
sequence (approximately half as an express bus driver and the
other half as a Board of Education driver; returning thereafter
to the former) and was

granted vacation pay for both types of

service and for the entire year.
Despite what happened the year before (which the Company
claims was an error) I find the "Note" in Section 23 to be binding

-2That "Note," which applies to the asterisk next to Section
23, PAID VACATIONS, reads:
"The above vacation agreement does not
apply to those drivers on Board of
Education runs."
The Union argues that the Note applies only when the driver
works the full vacation year on a Board of Education run; and
that in any event the Company's payment of the full vacation to
Miller the year before, for both sets of duties (including bus
driver work on Board of Education runs) represents a practice, to
which the Company is now bound, at least for Miller.
A variation in an explicit and and clear contract provision
requires more than one instance of non or different application.
The facts in this case show that other than the prior years' payment to the grievant, the long standing and consistent practice
has been not to pay vacation pay under Section 23 for Board of
Education runs, leaving vacation pay for that work to the different eligibility requirements and benefits of Section 38 entitled
"Board of Education, Pension and Welfare Benefits."

It is un-

disputed that for the vacation year involved, Miller had not
acquired sufficient eligibility for vacation pay under Section 38
Also, the language of the "Note" does not lend itself to
interpretation of application only when the driver works the
entire year on Board of Education runs.

It states simply and

clearly that the paid vacations under Section 23 "does not apply
to those drivers on Board of Education runs" (emphasis added). It
has no time limitations where such explicit condition could have
been included.

Had the parties intended to apply it only when

the driver worked the full year on Board of Education runs they
could and should have said so.

In the absence of any such condi-

tion, and particularly in the face of a consistent practice (with
the one exception noted) I am compelled to interpret the "Note"

-3as applicable to any and all times during the vacation year that
a driver works a Board of Education run.
Miller asserts that he relied on receiving a full year's
vacation when he returned to express bus driving, based on what
happened to him the year before.

I am not persuaded that he bid

on the runs involved solely or even significantly because of that
reason.

Also, in view of the contract language, supported by the

practice mentioned, I do not find any such reliance to whatever
extent, as a determinative basis to overturn that contract languagje
and extensive

practice.

Grievant Thompson was confronted by supervision with a
report that he was seen with his bus, off his route, making a
purchase of an illegal drug.
The Company directed him to take a drug test.

Whether he

refused or offered some excuse as to why he could not take the
test, he did not comply with the Company's directive.

There is

undisputed testimony that he or his Union representative stated
that Thompson didn't want to take the test because he "knew it
would be positive" and that he'd be "discharged." There is further
undisputed testimony that his Union representative asked the
Company if it would permit him to resign if he took the test and
it was positive.

At that point, the Company offered Thompson the

option of resigning or being dismissed.

He took the former and

signed a resignation statement.
I conclude that in the absence of any denial that he was
buying an illegal drug while on duty, the Company had legitimate
and reasonable grounds to suspect that he may have used the controlled substance and to require that he take a drug test.

Con-

sidering that he did not do so in the face of the contract provision providing for "forthwith discharge" for a refusal to take
the test, and the uncontroverted "admissions against interest"

-4regarding what the test would show, I find no fault with the
Company's offer to permit him to resign in lieu of dismissal.
That being so, I find his decision to elect to resign was
voluntary and not produced by "duress or intimidation."
That the Union representative present during the investiative and disciplinary steps was inexperienced, cannot fatally
prejudice the Company's action.

He was a duly elected Union

representative, with authority to handle disciplinary matters and
represent employees.

That the Union may "have asked" the Company

"not to use that Union representative" for matters of this type,
did not constitute notice by the Union to the Company that the
representative

lacked authority.

Indeed, if that were so, the

facts show that two of the three available Union representatives
could not be so utilized by the Company.

Such an extensive re-

straint cannot be relied on now to nullify the Company's managerial
right to impose discipline.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
1.

The Company did not violate the contract
in connection with the vacation pay of
Raymond Miller.

2.

The resignation of Riccardo Thompson was
not a result of duress or intimidation.
His resignation is valid and his grievance
is denied.

DATED: June 22, 1987
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I arn the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
-andLOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION of AMERICA

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100, Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The issues are:
1. The discharges of Irving Perez, Emilio
Correa and Barry Friedman.
2. The claim of Al Priolean for premium
pay for Saturday and Sunday, August 16
and 17, 1986.
A hearing was held on May 5, 1987 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All con-

cerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbi-

trator's Oath was waived.
Grievants Perez and Correa were within their probationary
periods when discharged.

Based on extensive past practice; a

prior Arbitration Award of the then Impartial Chairman Kheel involving operator Cuthbert, and the determination of the NLRB
(Region 2) of March 9, 1981, probationary employees are not covered by the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract.
Accordingly the propriety of a discharge of a probationary
employee may not be tested or challenged in arbitration, and I
am satisfied that this rule holds whether or not the Employer
gives reasons for the discharge.
Therefore the discharges of Perez and Correa are not
arbitrable.
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Consideration of the discharge of Barry Friedman turns on
whether he was a probationary or regular employee at the time of
his dismissal.

If the former, his grievance is disposed of in

the same manner as those of Perez and Correa.

If the latter, a

hearing on the merits of his discharge is to be held.
Though employed by the Employer earlier as a Trainee, I
am persuaded that Friedman did not become an "employee" within
the meaning of and covered by the collective bargaining agreement
until he occupied a job classification covered by the agreement.
In his case, he became a probationary employee when he became a
bus operator.

On that basis he was still within the probationary

period when terminated.

Therefore, as with Perez and Correa, his

dismissal is not challengeable in arbitration.
Mr. Priolean served on jury duty Monday through Friday,
August 11-15, 1986.

His regular work week is Monday through

Sunday, with Thursday and Friday as his regular days off.

Under

the jury duty provisions of the contract he was made whole for
his wages for Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, and was paid only
at the straight time rate for working the following Saturday and
Sunday.
The Employer asserts this is correct because Saturday and
Sunday were regular work days of his regular work week schedule.
The Union contends that because the grievant had to serve
on a jury on Thursday and Friday, which were his regular days off,
he lost those Off-days and those days should therefore be deemed
working days.

By consequence it asserts, his work week was chang-

ed to Monday through Friday, and Saturday and Sunday should become his "days off."

As he worked Saturday and Sunday, he should

receive premium pay for them, as his sixth and seventh workdays

-3-

that week.
The contract does not support this theory.

Section 28

Jury Duty only obligates the Employer to grant an employee "regular pay of his run for jury duty..." (emphasis added).

In the

instant case, the grievant was paid his regular pay for the runs
he would have made but for jury duty, namely on Monday, Tuesday
and Wednesday.

Properly he did not get his pay for Thursday and

Friday because these were days he was not scheduled to work and
were days that he did not miss runs because of jury duty.

And

finally, he returned to his regular work schedule on Saturday and
Sunday, made his regular runs those days, and received his regular pay.

He did not serve on the jury on Saturday and Sunday and
,

therefore lost no runs those days for which he was not compensated
Therefore, the Employer did what was required of him under the
contract.

If the contract read as some others do with this Union,

namely to grant Saturday and Sunday off when an employee serves
on a jury (as is the case in the contract with The Queens Transit
and Steinway Transit Corporations), the Union would prevail herein.

But the instant contract does not so provide.

As I see it,

the objective of Section 28 of the contract is to ensure that an
employee loses no money from lost runs due to jury duty.
case that objective and requirement have been met.

In this

Therefore the

claim for premium pay for the Saturday and Sunday of August 16
and 17 for Mr. Priolean is denied.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the
following AWARD:

-4-Th e grievances of Irving Perez, Emilio
Correa, Barry Friedman and Al Priolean
are denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: May 26, 1987
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

Impartial Chairman, Local 100 Transport Workers
Union of America -and- New York Bus Service

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100, Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Robert Warbington? If not, what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing .was duly held at which time Mr. Warbington and
representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitra-

tor's Oath was waived.
In connection with Warbington's discharge, and based on the
evidence before me, I am not convinced that the provisions and intent of Article 33 of the contract were adequately satisfied.

Nor

am I satisfied that the purposes of the second step of the grievance procedure were met.

I blame and find both the grievant and

Company representative responsible for the inadequacies and frustrations of full hearings and discussions of the reasons for
Warbington's discipline at both.
The parties are reminded that the role of the Impartial
Chairman is not solely to make findings of fact and decide contract disputes on the merits, but also to uphold each and every
contract provision negotiated by the parties.

Article 33, re-

quiring a hearing before discharge and the grievance procedure
to review the discharge, are integral parts of the contract and
have been negotiated for the purposes of providing hearings on

-2the question of cause, procedural and substantive due process,
and a chance for resolution of the dispute before resort to arbitration .
In the instant case these bi-laterally negotiated

purposes

and protections were frustrated by angry outbursts, charges other
than absenteeism on which Warbington's discharge was ultimately
based, and general disorderliness, leading to premature

termina-

tion of the hearings.
Accordingly, I have decided to remand this matter to the
point that a hearing under Article 33 was to be held.

I direct

that the Article 33 hearing be held again, and that thereafter if
necessary, the dispute follow the steps of the grievance procedure
with full opportunity throughout for complete discussions required
or implied by the contract.
As I have assessed joint blame, Warbington shall be reinstated for the foregoing purpose, but without back pay.
Again, lest anyone think this to be an "exercise in futility
with the same outcome probable, I consider the enforcement and
proper implementation of Article 33 and the grievance procedure
to be as important as a decision on the propriety of the discharge
Of course, the positions of the parties on the discharge are
expressly reserved and are in no way prejudiced by this procedural
decision.

I have made no decision on the merits and will do so

only if and when the matter comes back to me after the precedent
procedural steps have been exhausted.

DATED: July 20, 1987
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) ' ' '

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100 Transport Workers
Union of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Bus Service

The following

is my Opinion and Award on the following

issues:
[1] Did the Company violate Sections 18 and
34 of the collective bargaining agreement by refusing to assign Mark Colasacco
as a MIU driver? If so what shall be the
remedy?
[2] Whether the Company violated the collective
bargaining agreement by discontinuing the
practice of including Board of Education
drivers in the rotational assignment of
field trips? If so what shall be the remedy?
[3] Was there just cause for the discharge of
Robert Warbington? If not, what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were duly held, at which time the respective griev
ants appeared as did representatives of the above-named Union and
Company.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Issue No. 1
The Company rejected the grievant's pick for MIU (Mobile
Instructional Unit) work in August 1987 because the Board of
Education complained about him to the Company and requested that
he not be assigned as a MIU driver.
This was pursuant to that part of the contract between the
Company and the Board of Education which reads, in pertinent part:
"If the Chief School Business Executive or his
designee determines that an operator's competency falls below acceptable standards, or for
any other reasons, the contractor, upon written
notice ... shall not again employ this operator
on any part of the work to be performed hereunder..."
In July, a representative of the Board of Education wrote
the Company:

-2"Throughout the past school year, I received
negative feedback from my central staff concerning the performance of your driver, Mark
Colasacco.
I am requesting that he not be
assigned to the MIU's for the coming school
year."
I find that the Company's contract with the Board of Education, so far as the aforesaid provision is concerned, is not incorporated specifically or by reference into the collective bargaining agreement.

Section 31 of the collective agreement

on

which the Company relies does not cover general complaints by
the Board of Education about MIU drivers.

That Section by its

clear terms, is limited to the requirement that Company drivers
comply with the safety and medical rules and regulations of the

I
Board of Education.
It is entitled MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS, and makes
I
specific reference to the taking of physical examinations, and to
meeting the Safety Regulations of the Tribunals having jurisdiction, including the board of Education.
But the instant complaint about the grievant are allegations
not related, as far as I can tell, to safety or medical regulations
They simply relate to "performance" and are based only on "feed
back."
Hence, the provisions in the Company's Board of Education
contract that the Company will not continue a MIU driver about
whom the Board of Education complains for reasons other than
violations of medical or safety rules, is not binding on the Union
or bargaining unit drivers.
Unless the allegations of the board of Education relate
specifically to medical or safety rules (which if disputed would
then have to be proved in an adversary proceeding), the Company
had no right to deny the grievant his MIU bid or remove him from
MIU work.

Here the complaint about the grievant was not shown

-3to involve a medical or safety violation, and additionally was
not substantiated.

The contract Section violated is Section 18.

Issue No. 2
The unvaried practice since at least 1979, has been to include Board of education drivers in the rotational assignment of
field trips.

From then until the effective date of the new collec-

tive bargaining

agreement the inclusion of Board of Education

drivers did not represent additional costs of the Company.
However, with the new overtime provision of the new contract
if and when Board of Education drivers received field trip assignments, those assignments, together with their regular runs, could
result in an entitlement to overtime pay.

With that impact, the

Company unilaterally discontinued assigning field trips to Board
of Education drivers.
The question posed is whether the Company had the right to
do that.
The contract contains no provisions regarding the assignment
of field trips.

Hence we are not dealing with a practice codified

in the written contract, or even a practice different from what
the contract provides.

In my view, this is a classical case in

which a long standing, unvaried practice engaged in and accepted
by the Company and the Union, has become a jointly agreed to condi-Jtion of employment; and thi/s a bi-'laterally bound

arrangement,

"grafted on" to the collective bargaining agreement.
cannot be unilaterally

As such it

changed.

Here, the Company had the new overtime liability well within its contemplation when it negotiated the new overtime provisions
of the contract. It knew or should have known that the field trips
were being rotated among Board of Education drivers, and knew or
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should have known that the new pay arrangements would affect those
drivers and that under the practice there could be an overtime pay
liability.
The Company could and should have negotiated to exclude the
Board of Education drivers from field trips, or negotiated changej"
in the rotation practice to eliminate or reduce any overtime pay
impact.

It did not do so.

Therefore the practice continues to be

binding, and the overtime pay liability naturally follows.

A

change is for bargaining, not unilateral action or arbitration.
Issue No. 3
The well settled rule on "excessive absenteeism" is applicable to this case.

Simply stated, the rule is that an excessive

quantity of absences, for whatever reasons, and even if beyond the
employee's fault or control, such as illness or other personal
problems, is a legitimate ground for discharge,

The rationale

for this rule is that an employer is entitled to have a work force
that maintains regular and prompt attendance, and that because
of the operational or service needs of his business, an employer
need not continue in employment an employee who cannot provide
regular service and productivity.
That is the case presented here.

The grievant's absentee

record is considerably worse than other employees and I am persuaded that it reached an excessive level.

That many of those

absences, unfortunately, may have been due to sickness or personal
difficulties beyond the grievant's fault or control is immaterial.
What is material is that the Company, providing transportation
services to the public, could not rely on the grievant to be at
work when and as required.
The grievant was progressively disciplined.
ly warned and suspended.

He was previous

His record did not improve, so his
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discharge was justified.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARDS:
[1] The Company violated Section 18 of the collective bargaining agreement by refusing to assign
Mark Colasacco as a MIU driver. He shall be
granted his bid and assigned or restored to
MIU driving. As he was not damaged monetarily,
no back pay is awarded.
[2] The Company violated the collective bargianing
agreement by discontinuing the practice of including Board of Education drivers in the rotational assignment of field trips. The Company shall restore the practice and shall make
whole those drivers who lost wages as a result
of discontinuing the practice.
[3] The discharge of Robert Warbington was for just
cause.

DATED: November 4, 1987
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

I, Eric J , Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

\L CHAIRMAN, LO
UNION OF AMERICAN -and- NEW YORK BUS SERVICE

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 100, Transport Workers
Union o f America

A W A R D

and
New York Bus Service

The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named Union and Employer,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties
at a hearing on July 16, 1987, makes the following AWARDS:
1.

The written warning notice issued on May 1,
1987 to Mark Colasacco was for just cause. I
find no reason why the Employer's Director of
School Bus Operations would misrepresent what
he observed regarding the grievant's carelessness in driving his own car from the property.
It has been previously established that reckless driving of an employee's own vehicle in
or around the Employer's property is subject
to discipline.

2.

The Union's grievance on behalf of Raymond 0.
Brown insofar as it charges harrassment, is
denied. In view of the reports from one or
more passengers, I cannot find that the Employer
"harrassed" the grievant by requiring him to
take a blood test. However, the Employer is
cautioned that when it has the chance to independently observe an employee about whom there has
been a complaint regarding possible alcohol or
drug use or influence, the Employer should use
that opportunity to make its observations and
appraisals of the employees condition. The
Employer had that opportunity in this case when
it removed the grievant from the road. Had it
done so, the hospital test of the grievant's
blood, which turned out to be negative, may have
been unnecessary. The Employer is directed to
make such independent observations in the future,
when able to do so, before automatically directing an employee to the hospital for a blood test.
However, that the Employer did not do so in this
case, although procedurally precipitate, did
not constitute "harrassment."
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The Union's grievance on behalf of V. Earthman,
is denied. There is no proof in the record that
the ticket and violation were wrongfully issued
or that there was an agreement between the Employer and the grievant that the matter would be
resolved without a citation in the grievant 1 s
personnel record.

4.

The Union's grievance on behalf of William Jones
for holiday pay for election day and Veteran's
day, 1986, is denied. The record establishes
that by consistent past practice, a Board of
Education driver gets pay for those two holidays,
provided he works the day before and the day
after the holiday, unless he has a legitimate
written excuse. This practice, for those two
non-itemized holidays based on the school calendar,
is consistent with the eligibility requirements
for the enumerated ten paid holidays. The grievant did not work the day before or the day after
election day or Veteran's day, and did not present
a written excuse of an acceptable type.

5.

The Union's grievance on behalf of Vitor Cevallor
is granted. The Employer has not made clear to
drivers that they are not to park in the vicinity
of 50th - 51st Street and Park Avenue. I am not
persuaded that they have been clearly instructed
circulate around the block. Indeed, there is
credible testimony that dispatchers instructed the
drivers to park at that location until called into service. That being so, the Employer is directed
to reimburse the grievant for the two summonses or
tickets he received for wrongful parking.

6.

A decision on the Union's grievance on behalf of
Sabato Munoz is deferred pending further work from
the parties.

7.

The Union's grievance on behalf of J. Pellot, is
granted. The contract calls for the payment at
the top rate" after thirty consecutive months on
the job. The contract does not provide for a
numerical calculation of any thirty consecutive
month period into days. Hence, the Employer erred
when he translated the thirty consecutive months
in the grievant's case into 912 days. Despite the
Employer's intent to equalize any thirty consecutive month period for all employees, by using the
912 day figure in all cases, the contract provides
otherwise. Under the contract, the Employer is
required to apply whatever thirty month period is
actually applicable to any employee progressing
under the rate progression schedule, at the time
individually involved, even if for some it may be
a day or so shorter or longer than for another.
Here, the grievant should have gone to the "top

-3rate" on March 10th, rather than March llth.
The Employer shall make the grievant whole
in the amount of $21.73.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: August 17, 1987
STATE OF New York )gs
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J Schmertz do hereby affirm upon by Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communications

Workers of America

OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
New York Telephone

Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Articles 1 or 31
of the contract by having the District
Secretary perform certain duties which
the Union claims are the job of the Administrative Clerk in the Nanuet District
Office while the Administrative Clerk was
on vacation in 1985?
A hearing was held on February 10, 1987 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
trator's Oath was waived.

The Arbi-

The parties subsequently filed cases

and case citations.
The Union is correct in its assertion that the disputed
work assignments are generally assigned to and performed by the
bargaining unit Administrative Clerk.

But it is wrong if it is

suggesting by consequence that those duties are exclusively

bar-

gaining unit work.
By the wording of the job description of the bargaining unit
job of Administrative Clerk, and by unvaried practice for an extended period of time, the work involved has been handled by both
the District Secretary and the Administrative Clerk.

The "job

brief" of the Administrative Clerk provides in significant part
for "clerical duties... assisting on District or Division Secretary with payrolls, vouchers and other personnel matters."

Ap-

plicable to the instant case, the Administrative Clerk does not
have duties indigenous or exclusive to that job classification,

-2but rather takes on work emanating from and delegated by the
District Secretary.

This is further confirmed by the Union's

memo of October 8, 1980 to its local Presidents.

Paragraph F

of Exhibit A thereof reads:
Those employees who assist the District or
Division Secretary and whose duties generally include but are not limited to preparing
payroll report changes and adjustments,
checking and preparing bills for payment, recording wage, benefit and other information
in employees personnel files, handling, summarizing and preparing reports on absence,
safety, etc., shall be assigned the title
Administrative Clerk in the SS-1 Band as
shown in the Attachment hereto. (Emphasis added)
The evidence in this case clearly shows that the incumbent
District Secretary and the incumbent Administrative Clerk worked
interchangeably on the duties which the Union claims belongs to
the Clerk, and also that the Secretary has done so over the many
past years while the Clerk has been on vacation or absent.
So, what is involved here is not the performance of exclusive bargaining

unit work by a supervisory employee, but rather,

whether when a bona fide bargaining unit job has been established
to regularly handle work which because of quantity or ministerial
nature, the Secretary cannot or does not handle, the Secretary
can take on that work temporarily when the Clerk is on vacation.
The Union is correct in pointing out that a specific bargaining unit job exists; that it has regular duties; and that
those duties were being performed while the Clerk was on vacation
But under the circumstances of this case I do not agree with the
Union that the Clerk job had to be filled by a bargaining unit
employee while the Clerk was on vacation; or that the duties
usually performed by the Clerk could not be handled by the Secretary during that vacation period.

o __

As I see it, the job of Administrative Clerk was established
to handle the extra quantity, some routine or ministerial duties
and whatever else within the meaning of the job brief, that the
Secretary could not or chose not to regularly handle personally.
Under that arrangement, and by practice, what the Clerk did the
Secretary could and had the right to do also.

I am satisfied that

that right can be exercised in short term situations like vacations, illnesses or other short absences.
However, in recognition of the fact that the Clerk job was
established to handle the overflow and other delegated duties
from the Secretary to the Clerk, I would consider it prohibitive
if for an extended period of time the Secretary performed duties
customarily assigned to the Clerk, when in fact the overflow or
delegated work continued to exist in the quantity that caused and
maintained the establishment of the Clerk classification.
For example, if the Clerk was laid off at a time when the
quantity of overflow or delegated work continued at regular levelp,
and the Secretary worked overtime, or at an accelerated pace or
under circumstances showing that she was doing not only her regular work but also that customarily assigned to the Clerk, I
would find an improper elimination of a bargaining unit job and
an encroachment by a supervisory

employee on what the parties had

agreed would make up the unit job of Administrative

Clerk.

But, in the instant case, though it is stipulated that the
Secretary did certain things generally handled by the Clerk while
the Clerk was on vacation, there is no evidence that the situation
was other than temporary or that the Secretary had not set aside
some of her own regular duties to take on some items of daily
routine generally handled by the Clerk.
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As such, I would uphold a continuous recognition that so
long as there is the overflow quantity of work, or duties generally delegated to the Clerk, the bargaining unit job of Administrative Clerk or the Union's jurisdiction over that job should
not be jeopardized.
But the Secretary's exercise of her right to take on all
or any aspects of a job for which she is ultimately responsible
and over which she has authority, during the temporary period of
the Clerk's vacation does not, in my view, constitute jeopardy.
For, with the end of the vacation, the arrangement for which the
Clerks job was created, namely to assist the Secretary, would be
resumed, and the short period of time during which the Company
managerially chose to do without the assistance and convenience
of a clerk would come to an end.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
Under the circumstances and facts of this
case, the Company did not violate the contract by having the District Secretary perform certain duties which the Union claims
are the job of the Administrative Clerk in
the Nanuet District Office while the Administrative Clerk was on vacation in 1985.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 20, 1987
STATE OF New York)ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Communications Workers of America
Local 1103, Westchester
and

OPINION AND AWARD
CWA Case No. 1-85-163
NYTel Case No. A-85-141

New York Telephone Company

The stipulated issue is:
Was Walter Munkelwitz discharged for just
cause ?
A hearing was held on December 19, 1986 at which time Mr.
Munkelwitz, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
trator's Oath was waived.

The Arbi-

The Company filed a post-hearing brief;

the Union filed an arbitration decision.
Though he died prior to the hearing in this matter, I
accept Dr. Callerame's notes taken during examinations of the
grievant to be accurate and probative of what the grievant

(and

his wife) said at those time and what the Doctor found the grievant ' s condition to be, as well as what the Company learned from
the grievant's personal physician.
I also accept as accurate, the Company's surveillance film
of the grievant's physical activities and movements while on disability leave.
I found the film disclosed material differences between
what the grievant physically did and was able to do, and the contrary limitations he asserted to Dr. Callerame.
Therefore I find that that the Company had sufficient
grounds to believe that the grievant (and/or his wife, with the
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grievant's knowledge and acquiescence and in his presence) materially and willfully misled it regarding the nature and extent of
the grievant's disability leave of absence, and did so for the
purpose or with the unmerited result of extending the disability
leave and disability payments.
This misrepresentation

is a violation of the "Codes We

Work By," particularly the provision Integrity and Your Job; as
well as violative of well accepted rules and expectations of
employee conduct.

The penalty of dismissal is proper.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Walter Munkelwitz was for
just cause.

DATED: May 4, 1987
STATE OF New York)Q Q
COUNTY OF New York)

"

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IBEW, Local 1991

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #87-12324

and
The Okonite Company
The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the contract by
denying the bids of J. Kerrigan and T.
Patrick respectively to the positions of
pipe-fitter A (Bid 86-2) and truck mechanic (Bid 87-4)? If so what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on September 25, 1987 at which time
Messrs. Kerrigan and Patrick, hereinafter referred to as "the
grievants" or as "Kerrigan" and "Patrick," appeared, as did representatives of the above-named

Union and Company.

All con-

cerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbi-

trator's Oath was waived.
The Company denied the bids of both grievants because it
deemed them unqualified within the meaning of Article XV Section
2(e) of the contract.
The jobs in question are undisputedly

"craft jobs."

are so listed in Article XV Section 1 of the contract.

Both

Section

2 of Article XV, clearly makes Section 2(e) thereof applicable
to the filling of job vacancies under the general provisions of
Article XIV of the contract.
Section 2(e) of Article XV reads in pertinent part:
"... If the job; cannot be so filled, employees from outside the craft may bid
for such job provided they are found competent to perform the required work."
Both grievants bid from jobs "outside the crafts" of pipefitter and truck mechanic.
The arbitral rulings in cases of this type are well settled,
The majority of arbitrators uphold an employer's assessment of

-2a bidder's qualifications or competence unless that assessment
is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonably
considerations.

based on irrelevent

This arbitrator shares that majority view.

Here I cannot find the Company's decisions regarding the
grievants' bids to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
I am satisfied that both the pipe-fitter A job and the truck
mechanic job are skilled craft positions requiring special qualifications, and with considerable responsibility.

The pipe-fitter

A deals with 100 miles of piping, containing air, gas, water and
steam under 300 pounds of pressure.

The single truck mechanic

maintains and services 30 fork lift trucks, of varying sizes,
from 4,000 to 30,000 pounds capacity.

Article XV Section

l(e)

contemplates and requires that a successful bidder be "competent"
to perform the duties upon appointment.

The record does not

support a view that the grievants would have been able to do so.
Important to my mind is the fact that as a matter of substantial past practice, employees have not successfully bid on a
craft job from outside the craft without first going through a
Company sponsored apprentice program or without some related work
experience

in other employment or in the military.

The grievants did not meet those conditions.

Neither had

the kind of prior work experience that qualified them or experience in the military, and neither bid for or went through the
periodic apprentice training programs.
experience

Kerrigan had had some

for a couple of months working with a plumber on

residential work, but I cannot dispute the Company's conclusion
that that work was significantly different, less complicated and
with significantly less responsibility than the industrial pipe-
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fitter duties of the job sought.

That Kerrigan was at one time

told by a foreman that he was "qualified" for and offered the
pipe-fitter job, is also indeterminative.
opportunity then.

Kerrigan rejected that

The circumstances surrounding that "offer"

are unclear, and certainly not enough to establish Kerrigan's
"competence" for the instant bid, the question of the foreman's
authority to make such an offer notwithstanding.
That Patrick was transferred to the truck mechanic job eight
years ago is also not enough to overturn the foregoing conclusions
He worked the job only a day and a half, and left it on his own
initiative, so his competence remained in doubt, and there was
no testimony regarding the basis for that transfer and no documentary evidence of the transfer.

Neither the residential plumber

work performed by Kerrigan, nor the day and one-half as a truck
mechanic by Patrick met the otherwise unvaried Company practice
of requiring three to five years of prior experience in related
work, to qualify for a craft opening.
Accordingly for the foregoing reason, I find no basis to
nullify the Company's rejection of the bids of both grievants.
With that binding determination, I recommend that the
Company consider giving Kerrigan an opportunity to demonstrate
his competence on the pipe-fitter B job, if and when there is an
opening in that classification.

However acceptance or rejection

of this recommendation is solely for the Company to decide.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the contract
by denying the bids of J. Kerrigan and T.
Patrick respectively to the positions of
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pipe-fitter A and Truck Mechanic

DATE: October 20, 1987
STATE OF New York)
COUNTY OF New York) °"

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1130 1078 86

I.B.E.W., Local 1228

and
Outlet Company/WJAT-TV

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the terms of the
respective contracts with respect to the
compensation of the following employees
for the period December 1 through December
10, 1985?
Frank Fortin
Douglas White
Robert Izzo
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on December 10, 1986 in Providence,
Rhode Island at which time representatives of the above-named
Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were offered full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived and

each side filed a post-hearing brief.
filed post-hearing

In addition, the Union

statements of the relief it is seeking.

The dispute centers on whether the grievants named in the
stipulated issue should receive overtime pay pursuant to the overtime provisions of the contract for time worked outside and beyong their regular workday and work week

and for certain travel

time and time devoted to gathering and transporting equipment,
all for and during their assigned coverage of the Vatican Synod
in Rome, Italy during the period involved.
For two specific reasons the Company asserts that no overtime pay is due or warranted.

First, because the circumstances

-2are controlled by Article II Section 1 (d) of both applicable
contracts, which read:
When placed on detached duty for extended
periods outside of one hundred (100) miles
of Providence, Rhode Island, or for assignment to a school or training session designed to further the education of the employee,
the employee shall be paid only at his regular weekly rate of pay for such time as he is
outside Providence, Rhode Island. Overtime
will not be paid to the employee for travel
time and for all time devoted to fulfilling
the requirements of the training or education
assignment. No employee shall be assigned to
such duty without the permission of the employee involved and the Union.
And second, that the grievants and the Union were told that
the budget for the assignment could not exceed $8000.

As that

limit excluded only straight time salaries, the grievants and the
Union knew or should have known that there was no money available
for overtime.
Additionally, and related to the second reason, the Company
claims that the assignment was largely for background pictures
and commentary for a later documentary; that there were no time
pressures involved; that all the work involved in Rome could have
been scheduled during the regular workday and that in any event,
by rule and practice overtime had to be approved by the Company
in advance in each instance.
The Union contends that the $8000 budget, limited to expenses other than wages and salaries, could not be construed to
put a limit or prohibit overtime work; that as the matter of wage
and salaries was not discussed as part of the budget, the Union
and the grievants had the logical right to assume that it did not
apply in any respect to their compensation; that by past practice
the Company paid overtime for out of town assignments, Article II
Section 1 (d) notwithstanding without the need of explicit
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Company approval prior to and for each overtime period involved;
that Article II Section 1 (d) is not controlling because its
application requires "the permission of the employee involved and
the Union" and no such permission, to its limitation was given in
this case by the grievants or the Union; and that the overtime
worked or required as part of the instant assignment was legitimate, reasonable, and consistent with the scheduling, logistical
and language problems the grievants faced at the location.
I have concluded that a ruling by me on the basic question
of whether overtime pay was warranted, waived or foreclosed by
the contract, will, if favorable to the Union, enable the parties
to work out the details of a financial remedy.
Based on the entire record, I find that the contract does
not bar the overtime the Union seeks for the grievants, nor was
there a waiver explicit enough to be mutually understood and
binding.
Article II Section 1 (d) is not controlling.

Because of

its unusual and specific limitions on overtime pay for extra
hours and travel, it expressly requires the "permission
employees involved and the Union."
plicit permission granted here.

of the

I find no express or even im-

As the discussions of an $8000

budget did not include discussion of wages or salaries, the question of whether any overtime pay had to be within the $8000 limit
was at least ambiguous and unclear.

I have no doubt that the

Company thought and intended that the $8000 include everything
except straight time wages.

But that was not clearly conveyed to

the grievants or the Union.

It was not unreasonable for the Union

and the grievants to believe that the $8000 budget was for everything except wages and salaries in their entirety - straight time
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and/or for overtime work as required to carry out the assignment.
I am satisfied that a more explicit, unambiguous statement or
delineation was required of the Company to properly and effectively convey to the Union and the grievants that overtime even if
legitimately worked was not part of the total budget.

Therefore

I find no waiver of normal overtime benefits by the grievants or
by the Union on their behalf.
The inadequacy of the Company's notice to the grievants and
the Union on the matter of overtime has a direct bearing on the
reasonableness of the overtime incurred.

I am persuaded that the

grievants approached the assignment as other out of town assignments had been handled, and put in extra hours as circumstances
required or warranted, expecting that the overtime provisions of
the contract would apply.

In the absence of an explicit prohibi-

tion or limitation by the Company, I do not find that they were
responsible to make a distinction between assignments under tight
time constraints, and their duties which could possibly be handled
more casually.

Nor was there reason for them to believe that each

overtime hour scheduled or planned had to be approved in advance
by the home office.
Important

I think is the fact that there is no evidence tha|z

the grievants "padded" their time or scheduled or incurred unnecessary overtime to inflate their earnings.

I conclude that

the type and quantity of overtime incurred, both in Rome and in
traveling and gathering equipment was reasonable and bonafide,
even if, with adequate notice, it might have been avoided or reduced .
Accordingly,

the Undersigned, duly designated as the

Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above-named parties makes the following AWARD:
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The Company violated the contracts by refusing to pay overtime in connection with the
grievants' assignments to cover the Vatican
Synod during the period December 1 through
December 10, 1985. Therefore it violated
the contracts with respect to the compensation of Frank Fortin, Douglas White and
Robert Izzo, for that period of time. The
parties are directed to work out the specific amounts of additional compensation due
the grievants as a result of this decision.
If the parties are unable to do so, the matter
shall be referred back to me for specific
rulings. For this latter purpose, I retain
jurisdiction.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 24, 1987
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) s b - '
I, Eric J. Schmertz, do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Interest Arbitration
between
Local 144, Hotel, Hospital, Nursing Home
& Allied Services Union, AFL-CIO

INTERIM

AWARD

and
Sea Crest Health Care Center

The above-named parties are presently before me in an interest arbitration dealing with contract economic issues which
I left undetermined

in my Interim Award of May 3, 1986 and also

as to economic issues for certain subsequent contract years.
In the course of the hearing on July 14, 1987 the Employer
offered, without prejudice to its case in this proceeding and
without prejudice to any final decision by the Arbitrator, to
grant to its covered employees payments in lump sum amounts
equivalent to a 3% wage increase for the year 1985 and similar
lump sum payments to said employees equivalent to a 3% wage
increase for the year 1986, less the $300 lump sum granted each
employee in December 1986.
I find this offer to be responsible and sensible and therefore make it my Interim Award as follows:
Without prejudice to its case in this arbitration, and without prejudice to a final arbitration decision, the Employer shall grant to
each of its covered employees a lump sum payment
equivalent to a 3% wage increase for the year
1985 and a similar lump sum payment equivalent
to a 3% wage increase for the year 1986, less
the $300 lump sum granted said employees in
December 1986.

DATED: July 20, 1987
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Brookhaven Beach HRF

SECOND INTERIM
AWARD

and
Local 144 S.E.I.U.
Absent authoritative information from the State of New
York and until the "statute of limitations" has run, the record
is devoid of any determinative evidence regarding whether
Brookhaven will or will not be required to return to the State
revenue related to an "added staff appeal" and "bed conversion"
during the year 1984.
That being so, pending further developments on that question, and for other reasons based on the extensive record before me from the many hearings held in this matter, I find on
an interim basis, that Brookhaven is affordable under the Industr
Contract to the following extent and I direct Brookhaven to make
the following payments applicable to the contract years of 1984
and 1985:
1. Brookhaven's previous payment of the 1984
"lump sums" is affirmed.
2. Employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement shall also be paid lump
sum payments applicable to their job classifications in amounts equivalent to the
6%% wage increase under the contract for
the year 1984 and equivalent to a 4% wage
increase for the contract year 1985.
One-half of said payments shall be made
within 30 days of the date of this Award,
and the remaining one-half shall be paid
within 45 days of the date of this Award.
3. With regard to Brookhaven's contributions
to the Welfare Fund, my Interim Award of
July 23rd, 1985 is affirmed and shall
continue to apply.
1. The Arbitrator is aware of the fact that the 1985 wage increases are presently the subject of industry-wide arbitrations,
and is also aware of the fact that much of the Industry has implemented 4%. In this case I shall retain jurisdiction over any
further consideration of the 1985 wage increase as may be warranted or appropriate. The rights of the parties hereto with regard to that are expressly reserved.
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With regard to the Pension Fund, the
contribution formula set forth in my
Award of July 23rd, 1985 shall also
apply, but effective June 1, 1987.
I expressly exclude from this Award any
determinations with respect to any adjustment in wages and/or contributions
to the Funds for the contract year 1986.
Those are matters for negotiations between the parties and for arbitration
before me if negotiations fail.
As my Second Interim Award in this matter,
I continue to retain jurisdiction over
any further consideration of the 1985
wage increase; over the 1986 wage scale
and Fund contributions; and for consideration of adjustments in the event of recoupment by the State of the aforesaid
revenue related to the 1984 staff appeal
and bed conversion.
This Award is based on the particular
circumstances and facts of this case and
this Home (which has been a "non-parity"
home), and establishes no precedent for
any other Home or facility or for any other
proceeding.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 27, 1987
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, I. A. T. S. E.
and

OPINION

AND

AWARD

Technicolor, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Whether an increase in nagative developing
speed from 100 to 125 feet per minute requires an increase in the rate under Article
17c of the contract? If so what shall be the
increase?
A hearing was held on June 24, 1987 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-exaininte witnesses.

The Arbi-

trator's Oath was waived.
I am persuaded that there should be some increase in the
rate, attendant to the increase in speed from 100 to 125 feet
per minute.

It is undisputed that the increase in speed will in-

crease productivity and/or the Employer's capability for greater
productivity.

Based on equitable considerations as well as

relevant practice, the employees should benefit monetarily in
the increased productivity capability, even if the increased speed
does not require greater skills, abilities or effort.
Relevant in my judgment is that after the machine speed was
increased in 1981 from 50 to 100 feet per minute, the parties
negotiated a rate increase of an additional 10% and $10 a week.
I am not convinced that increased productivity was not a factor
considered in negotiating that rate increase, though I recognize
that other factors were relied on as well.
Accordingly I take arbitral notice of the Employer's offer
in negotiating under Article 17c of the contract in this dispute
to increase the rate by what I deem to have been 2%% and $2.50
a week, despite the withdrawal of that offer at the arbitration.
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In those negotiations and at the arbitration hearing the
Union demanded a rate increase of 5% and $5.00.
Both of the aforesaid positions are based on arithmetic
theories and formulas founded on different premises.

Both theorie

and premises are logical and mathematically supportable.

Hence

the jusification for an equitable resolution and reconciliation
of the two.
Appropriate under the circumstances and I believe reasonable, is to fix a rate increase halfway between the Employer's
offer and the Union's demand.
Therefore, the Undersigned, Industry Arbitrator under the
collective bargaining agreement, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above-named parties makes the following
AWARD:
An increase in negative developing speed from
100 to 125 feet per minute requires an increase
in the rate under Article 17c of the contract.
The rate shall be increased by 3.75% and $3.75
a week.

Eric J. Schmertz
Industry Arbitrator
DATED: July 20, 1987
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

"

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

Pilots' System Board of Adjustment
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Airline Pilots

Association

,
and

AWARD
ALPA CASE NO. NY-33-86

Trans World Airlines

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Pilots' System Board
of Adjustment, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above-named parties, make the following AWARD:
1.

TWA had just and sufficient cause for
disciplining the grievant, Ronald G.
Huff, for some but not all of the reasons assigned in Captain H.B. Pratt's
letter dated March 24, 1986;

2.

Consequently the 60 days suspension
without pay and suspension of the grievant ' s dependents travel pass for one
year shall be proportionately reduced;

3.

The suspension is reduced to 30 days.
The suspension of the grievant's dependent travel pass for one year is reduced
to a pass suspension of six months;

4.

The Company shall make the grievant whole
for pay and benefits he did not receive,
as a result of the foregoing modified penalties .

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: January 12, 1987
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz, do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instru
ment, which is my AWARD.
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Clark Billie
Concurring in 1,2,3,4
Dissenting from 1,2,3,4
DATED: January
1987
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Clark Billie, do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

William J. Hillerbrand
Concurring in 1,2,3,4
Dissenting from 1,2,3,4
DATED: January
1987
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
I, William J. Hillerbrand, do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitration that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

D. H. Brown
Concurring in 1,2,3,4
Dissenting from 1,2,3,4
DATED: January
1987
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss
I, D , H. Brown, do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

D. H. Brown
Concurring in 1,2,3,4
Dissenting from 1,2,3,4
DATED: January
1987
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )
I, D. H. Brown, do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

Pilots' System Board of Adjustment
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Airline Pilots

OPINION

Association

of
and

CHAIRMAN

Trans World Airlines
In accordance with the arbitration provision of the collective bargaining agreement between Airline Pilots' Association,
hereinafter referred to as "ALPA" or the "UNION," and Trans World
Airlines, Inc., hereinafter referred to as "TWA" or the "Company,"
the Undersigned was selected as the Chairman of a System Board of
Adjustment to hear and decide together with the ALPA and TWA designated members of said Board the following stipulated issue:
Whether or not TWA had just and sufficient
cause for disciplining Ronald G. Huff for
the reasons assigned in Captain H.B. Pratt's
letter dated March 24, 1986.
Captain Pratt's March 24, 1986 letter referred to in the
stipulated issue imposed two sanctions on Mr. Huff; suspension
without pay for sixty days and suspension of his spouse's dependent travel pass for one year.

A grievance was filed on March 28,

1986, which was denied following a hearing on April 14, 1986. Appeal was taken to the System Board of Adjustment by written ALPA
submission, dated April 28, 1986.

Captains Clark Billie and

William J. Hillerbrand served as the TWA designated Board members
and Captain D.H. Brown served as the sole designated Board member
with agreement by the parties that he would have two votes.
Hearings were held in New York City on August 14 and 15,
1986, at which time Mr. Huff hereinafter referred to as "Huff" or
as the grievant appeared.

All concerned were afforded full oppor-

tunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Oath of the Arbitrators was waived. A

o

stenographic record was taken.
brief.

Each side filed a post-hearing

Following receipt of the briefs, the Board met in exec-

utive session on December 15, 1986.
FACTS
The central facts in this proceeding involve the conduct of
Huff, a TWA pilot, during the strike of TWA flight attendants which
began on March 7, 1986.

On March 7, 1986, TWA flight attendants

elected to strike TWA.

Kathryn Lynn Huff, Huff's wife, was a TWA

flight
attendant who chose to strike on March 7, 1986.
"
On March 6, 1986, late in the evening just
before the strike
'
was scheduled to begin on March 7, she called Huff who was on layover in Omaha to tell him of her deep anxieties caused by the stride
and her need to be able to speak to and be with him.

On March 7,

1986, Huff return home to St. Louis and was scheduled to fly on
March 8 and 9.

On March 8 he was scheduled as first officer to

fly from St. Louis to Chicago and return that day on Flight 597 anc
fly from St. Louis to Houston on Flight 564.

The crew was sched-

uled to layover in Houston on the night of March 8 and return to
St. Louis on March 9.
While in St. Louis on the night of March 7 and before flight
departure time on March 8, the Huffs engaged in long and anxious
discussions about whether Kathryn Huff should or could stay alone.
The possibility of Huff's son, Steve, staying with Kathryn was
considered, but this would depend on his willingness and ability
to do so.

Steve was expected to arrive in St. Louis from the West

Coast on March 8, before Huff would return to St. Louis from Chicago
Another possibility considered was Kathryn accompanying Huff to
Houston on Flight 597.

Other possibilities also were considered
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but rejected as not feasible.
Kathryn drove Huff to the airport on March 8 for his St.
Louis to Chicago flight and caused a note to be delivered to him
in the cockpit which advised him that she was going to meet
Steve's flight to see if he would stay with her.

If not, she

would meet him on his return and fly with Huff to Houston.

Steve

was unable to stay with her and Kathryn flew to Houston on Flight
597, utilizing her dependent's travel pass.

She also returned to

St. Louis from Houston on Flight 564, utilizing her dependent
travel pass.

It is the use of this pass while she was a striking

flight attendant and Huff's involvement

in her use that present

the issues in this proceeding.
The documents generated by TWA in contemplation of the flight
attendants strike are important aspects of the background of what
follows.

Prior to the strike, TWA issued a bulletin which in

relevant part stated:
In the event of a strike, pass/reduced rates
on TWA and OAL/s will cease immediately for
all striking employees.
All X-CAP procedures will be cancelled unless
special authorization is provided by operational planning.
The bulletin was posted in the appropriate places and TWA
personnel, including the grievant, had an obligation to read and
be responsible for its contents.

While Huff did not recall seeing

or reading this bulletin, he admitted that he knew or believed
that striking personnel, as such, would be denied travel pass
privileges.
In addition to the posting of the bulletin, TWA had also
sent a letter to TWA pilots (including Huff) which dealt specifically with some problems that a flight attendants' strike could
present.

The letter, dated February 28, 1986, dealt with several

matters including
stated:

travel benefits.

In relevant part the letter
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"Travel benefits for you and your family, including ACM authority, are not expected to
be curtailed during the strike ...."
On the flight to Chicago from St. Louis, Huff claims that
he spoke to the pilot, Captain Southam, about his wife's condition in which he described her as "a basket case" and advised
Southam that it looked as if Kathryn would be flying to Houston
with them.

According to Huff there was additional conversation

about his wife's condition on the return flight from Chicago to
St. Louis.

Southam did not recall any significant conversation

concerning Kathryn and Huff conceded that he could not be sure how
much attention, if any, Southam was paying to what he was saying.
In any event, when they returned to St. Louis and about
twenty minutes before the flight was scheduled to depart for
Houston, Huff told Southam that Kathryn was aboard and was traveling as his dependent and not as a striking flight attendant.
Kathryn was seated in first class, as a result of a boarding pass
obtained by using her dependent travel pass.
There is some dispute about Captain Southam 1 s response to
Huff's statement.

Southam claimed he advised Huff that he thought

she was not entitled to fly on a travel pass because she was a
striking flight attendant.

Huff states that at first Southam did

express this belief, but then stated he thought there might be
merit to Huff's position that he, Huff, had a right to have her
fly as his dependent.

Although the words and emphasis differ, both

agree that Huff stated he could not leave her and might have to
take immediate leave if she was not permitted to fly.
Southam stated that rather than delay the flight if Huff
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left, he let Kathryn remain and the flight departed for Houston.
Huff insisted at the hearing that he thought Southam had agreed
with him; Southam was adamant that he had not.
On the flight to Houston, Kathryn had occasion to speak to
Paula Happe, a flight attendant who did not honor the strike.
Happe and Kathryn had previously had contact and recognized each
other.

Both agree that Happe told Kathryn why she was working.

They disagree about who initiated the conversation.
Kathryn began it; Kathryn said that Happe did.

Happe said

Both agree that

Kathryn commented, in substance, that Happe was a nice person but
probably would be lonely after the strike was over. Kathryn characterized the comment as one of concern.

Happe stated it upset her

and it impaired her in the performance of her duties for three
minutes or so.

She identified no duties that were not performed

and Kathryn saw no visible signs of upset.
took place out of the passengers view.

Happe's discomfort

Kathryn recalled addition-

al casual conversation and believe that Happe was friendly and
civil.

Happe, except for the claim that Kathryn's comment upset

her and "intimidated" her, had no complaints about Kathryn's behavior .
Upon arrival at Houston, Southam advised the Station Manager,
Bill Armstrong, of his problem with Huff.

Armstrong checked with

higher TWA authority and was told that it was Company policy that
striking flight attendants could not fly on their own pass or on
a dependent's pass.

While the grievant never told Armstrong he

would not fly if Kathryn was not permitted to board the flight,
he did so advise Southam in Houston.

To avoid delay of the flight,

Armstrong and Southam decided to let her fly to St. Louis and have
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the matter settled there.
While in Houston, Kathryn accompanied Huff to the operations
area which was barred to striking employees because TWA had serious concern about the striking union obtaining strike-related
information.

Huff admitted that he realized striking employees

would be or were barred from the area, but said he was not thinking of that circumstance.

He explained that Kathryn simply was

his wife accompanying him.
There also was an incident between Kathryn and a ramp service
agent in Houston.

The facts are in sharp dispute.

The ramp ser-

vice agent claimed that Kathryn said "shame on you" when she saw
him and made comments related to the strike.

She claims that her

comment was in response to his "passing gas" when he walked past
her.

In any event, there is no dispute that the agent was angry

and excited and apparently made some additional remarks.
was angry when he testified.

He also

There was testimony about some add-

itional events, including trash in the airplane and striker harassment of Happe when she left the terminal in Houston.

None of

these events were directly connected with Kathryn or Huff.

The

return flight from Houston to St. Louis was uneventful.
DISCUSSION
Captain Pratt's March 24, 1986 letter made the following
findings which formed the basis for the discipline imposed on
Huff:
1.

Mrs. Huff, a striking flight attendant, on
March 8 and 9 used her dependent pass in
violation of Company policy known to Ronald
Huff, who permitted and encouraged her to
use the pass;

2.

On March 9, 1986, Huff escorted a striking
flight attendant into the Houston operations area knowing that striking personnel
were forbidden access to the area;
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3.

Mrs. Huff created a disruptive atmosphere
by virtue of her conversation with Paula
Happe and the ramp service employee in
Houston.

4.

Before the flight from Houston departed
on March 9, 1986, Huff took exception to
the determination his wife was not entitled to fly and by virtue of his threat
not to work, Huff "seriously compromised"
the Captain and station personnel in their
endeavor to comply with Company policy.

The grievant claims that the Company policy concerning Mrs.
Huff's right to use her dependent pass, at the least, was ambiguous.

He further denies that he actually refused to fly because

he was never faced with an order to do so.

He also claims that

there was no disruption en route to Houston caused by Kathryn's
conversation with Paula Happe and that the incident with the ramp
service employee in Houston was solely a consequence of that employee's hostility.
I agree with the assertion that the pass policy contained in
the bulletin and the April 28 letter quoted earlier in this opinion was ambiguous.

The bulletin standing alone could have created

a latent ambiguity and combined with the April 28 letter, the
ambiguity was patent.

Reasonable persons could be uncertain as

to whether family travel rights which derived from Huff's employee
status were to be denied a striking employee who also was a dependent of a non-striking employee.

However, I find that in Houston,

on March 9, 1986, as far as Huff was concerned, the Company policy
was made perfectly clear and he knew that Company policy did not
permit his wife to use her dependent pass.
I agree with the Company that a threat by Huff to leave the
flight shortly before a scheduled departure was improper conduct.
I find it was in the nature of an ultimatum and had an intimidating
effect.

I find that the Company did not sustain its burden of
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establishing that Huff did make such a threat on March 8 when he
originally expressed his views to Captain Southam.

In fact, al-

though addressed in the brief, Captain Pratt's March 24 letter
makes no such claim for March 8.

However, the Company did sustain

its burden of proving such a threat was made on March 9 in Houston
and directly influenced the decision to let his wife board the
flight to St. Louis.
As for the alleged disruptive conduct of Mrs. Huff, there is
no evidence of a disruptive event en route to Houston other than
Happe's momentary reaction to what appears to have been a civil
conversation.

As for the incident with the Houston ramp service

employee, there also was a failure to prove any purposeful disruptive conduct on the part of Mrs. Huff.
Turning to Mrs. Huff's entry into the operations area with
Huff's assistance, this violated an important Company policy and
Huff was or should have been aware of that policy and its application.

Whether Huff thought of her as a striking employee or as

his wife is irrelevant.
security.

He was responsible for a breach of

While there is no evidence that information was obtained

by Mrs. Huff or that she had any such intent, her entry into the
forbidden area gave her potential access to the information and
that is all the Company need establish.
CONCLUSION
The following reasons assigned by Captain Pratt for imposing
discipline on the grievant were not established:
1. The allegation that on March 8, 1986, in
violation of a Company policy known to the
grievant, he permitted his wife to use her
dependent's pass. At that time the Company's
policy was ambiguous insofar as Huff was
concerned.
2. En route to Houston from. St. Louis Kathryn
Huff engaged in disruptive conduct; and

-93. While in Houston, she engaged in disruptive conduct. Neither reasons 2 nor 3 was
established by the evidence.
The following reasons assigned by Captain Pratt for imposin
discipline were established:
1. On March 9, 1986, in violation of Company
policy known to the grievant, he permitted his
wife to use her dependent's pass. On March 9,
the policy was clearly stated to Huff.
2. On March 9, 1986, he compromised the ability of his Captain and the Station Manager at
Houston to comply with Company directives by
his threats; and
3. While in Houston, he gave a striking flight
attendant access to the Operations Area, a
secure area, in violation of a Company policy
known to him.
In view of the foregoing holdings, sustaining some of the
charges and denying some of the charges, and considering the fact
that in quantity and importance no more than half the charges are
upheld, the original penalty shall be reduced by one-half.

I do

not find the resultant remaining penalties to be excessive.
Therefore:
1.

The suspension for one year of the dependent's pass by his wife is reduced to a six
month suspension.

2.

The sixty day suspension without pay is reduced to thirty days.

This decision does not decide whether TWA pilots, including
Huff, had a right to permit their striking dependents to use a
dependent travel pass under the terms of their contract with TWA.
The issue before this panel is not whether Huff's position concerning his wife's right to use a dependent pass is correct; rathejr
it concerns the manner in which he asserted and exercised that
claimed right after he knew of the Company's policy.

The con-

tract and collective bargaining law provide avenues of redress
through the grievance procedure in the event the Company's policy
was wrong.

DATED: January 12, 1987
Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 431 IUE
and

AWARD

Walden Truarc, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Were Haskell Sullivan, Lorraine Matthews, Willie
Jordan, and Katherine Johnson properly downgraded
from the position of Inspector? If not what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held on November 24, 1987 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company and the abovenamed grievants appeared.

All concerned were afforded full oppor-

tunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Based on the record before me I conclude and find that
the "training" given to the grievants to prepare them for certain
technological changes in the inspection process, was haphazard,
confusing, too short, uneven in terms of time devoted to each
employee and wrongfully unmindful of the fact that these long
service grievants had not for many years used or were trained in
the newly required basic math.

Considering their long service,

the Company should have done more for them by way of training,
with appropriate consideration of their formal education levels
and experience or lack of experience with calculators, hand
computers and basic math.
Accordingly I shall direct that each grievant be restored
to the Inspector position at the Inspector pay grade.

As I do not

know if they would have qualified had they received better training their restoration shall be without back pay.

Each shall

receive additional, meaningful training in the new inspection
procedures for a minimum of 20 hours.

Those who qualify at the
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end of that training period shall remain as Inspectors.

Those

who do not qualify shall be downgraded as before.

DATED: December 1, 1987
STATE OF New York )ss
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union 455, International
Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers
A W A R D
and
Western Massachusetts Electric
Company

The Undersigned,

duly designated as the Arbitrator pur-

suant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
1.

the discharge of David C. Wetherall is
affirmed;

2*.

the discharge of David R. Pellerin is
affirmed;

3.

the suspension of Gary J. Monte is affirmed ;

4.

the discharges of Michael T. Breton,
Kevin R. Dowd, Kevin J. O'Keefe, William
A. Smith and Theodore S. Williams are reduced to disciplinary suspensions. They
shall be reinstated forthwith without back
pay and the period of time from the date of
their discharges until their reinstatement
shall be deemed disciplinary suspensions;

5.

the discharges of Brian Kenney and Earl V.
Watson are reduced to disciplinary suspensions from March 13, 1986 to May 6, 1986.
They shall be reinstated forthwith and
receive back pay for the period from May
7, 1986, to the date of reinstatement,
subject to the limitations in Section
XVII of the collective bargaining agreement on the amount of back pay which may
be awarded, less earnings from gainful
employment earned during the period for
which back pay has been awarded; and

6.

the Arbitrator retains jurisdiction for
resolution of disputes over the interpretation and application of the foregoing AWARD.

! '

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

*'

•*-
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DATED: June 12, 1987
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) °"
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

_x

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Western Massachusetts
Company

Electric

and

O P I N I O N

Local Union 455, International
Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers

This arbitration was held pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement, dated July 1, 1984, between Western
Massachusetts Electric Company and Local Union 455 of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, who are the
parties to this arbitration. The Undersigned was selected as the
Arbitrator. Hearings were held on June 24, July 14, 15, 16, 18,
23 and 24, August 6, 7, and 8, September 3, 4 and 5, November 5,
6, 7, 13 and 14, and December 11, 12 and 22, 1986. Both parties
presented oral testimony and documentary evidence and each filed
a post-hearing brief. The Arbitrator's oath was waived. This
opinion is in support of the Award issued on June 12, 1987.

THE ISSUE
This proceeding involves grievances arising out of the
discharge of ten employees; subsequent to his discharge and the
filing of the grievances, one of the discharged employees was
suspended in lieu of discharge.

The parties did not stipulate an

issue, but based on their contentions throughout the 21 days of
hearings and in their briefs, the issue is the usual one in
1

disciplinary cases:
Did the employer have just cause for discharging each
of the nine employees and suspending the tenth
employee, and if not, what shall be the remedy?"
Preliminary Issues Determined
At the outset of these proceedings, the Arbitrator decided
two preliminary issues.

First, he would and could determine the

rights of the parties only under the collective bargaining and
that he would not determine or purport to determine the Union's
pending unfair labor practice claim.

However, this does not

preclude consideration in this proceeding of facts which may be
relevant in both contexts.

Second, the Arbitrator decided that

he had and would retain jurisdiction over the
employee

grievance of the

(Gary Monte) whose discharge was revoked in favor of

suspension.

Both of those initial determinations

remain

unchanged.
THE FACTS
The Contract Provisions and the February 20 Company Policy
Statement.
Several provisions of the 1984 collective bargaining
agreement concerning employee travel and meal expenses and
benefits are relevant in this proceeding.

The most important

* At the beginning of the hearing, the Company pointed out
that Section XVII of the collective bargaining agreement contains
limits on the award of back-pay. In addition, the parties
stipulated that in the event there was an award of back-pay, the
arbitrator would retain jurisdiction to hear and determine issues
which might arise in implementing the award. (Hearing, December
22, 1986, at pp. 115-121).

provision is the one which provides for a so-called Overnight
Lodging Plan (OLP). It was added to the collective bargaining
agreement in 1984. In pertinent part, the provisions relating to
the

OLP state (1984 Collective Bargaining Agreement, p. 96):
When an employee is scheduled on an IMF assignment and
the distance from his/her home base is fifty miles or
more and the employee elects to stay overnight, the
following provisions apply:
In lieu of Expenses A through D, the employee will be
entitled to a per diem of $50.00 to cover lodging and
meals. This per diem will only be paid upon
presentation of a valid motel/hotel receipt for the
period involved. Lodging arrangements, other than a
motel/hotel room, must have prior approval of
supervision to be eligible under this provision.
*****
The reference to "Expenses A through D" is to daily travel

allowances payable to an employee required to make his own
transportation arrangements to report to a job location other
than his "home plant".

Payment is based on the distance of an

assigned location from the employee's "home plant".

Expenses

paid under "A" would be the lowest because it covers locations
closest to the home station of the employee. The relevant
provisions in this proceeding are "C" which provides payment of
$25.77 per day for one way distance over 50, but less than 70,
miles, and "D",

which authorizes payment of $29.11 per day for

one way distance over 70, but not over 90 miles.

These are the

highest amounts payable under the A-D contract provision.
(Collective Bargaining Agreement, p. 95).
Provisions and practices relating to reimbursement for meal
expenses during overtime and the use of Company-supplied

transportation also became involved in this proceeding.

They

will be referred to in the course of this opinion.
"IMF" (in the OLP provision) refers to Interplant Maintenance Force which, in substance, is a group of maintenance
workers assigned to a home plant who periodically are assigned
for relatively short periods to other plants for maintenance and
repairs.

Each grievant was discharged for conduct while he was

a member of the IMF assigned to the employer's West Springfield
(Mass.) Station, which was his "home plant" for the purposes of
the contract.
One other document became relevant. On or about February 20,
1986, the Company issued a written policy statement which
described the Company policy concerning the kinds of documentation it would accept in order to pay OLP claims.
The Discharge and Suspension Letters
On the morning of March 11, 1986, the employer held an
investigatory meeting pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement. The ten employees, together with Union and Company
representatives, were present. There is some dispute as to
precisely what occurred at this meeting and, to the extent
relevant to the decision, the contentions of the parties are
discussed later in this opinion. The subject of the meeting was
the Company's concern, after it had made an investigation, that
the ten employees had engaged in misconduct concerning claims
they made under the Overnight Lodging Plan during the fall of
1985. In the afternoon following the meeting, the Company
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officials met and either decided or confirmed a previous
determination or inclination to discharge all ten employees.
There was some additional

investigation on March 12, and the

decision to discharge was implemented

on March 13, 1986.

The following employees were advised they were
discharged in identical letters from the Company, dated March 13,
1986:
Michael T. Breton
Kevin R. Dowd
Brian Kenney
Gary J. Monte
Kevin J. O'Keefe
David R. Pellerin
William A. Smith
Earl V. Watson
David C. Wetherall
Theodore S. Williams
The letter stated:
Effective March 13, 1986 your employment with Western
Massachusetts Electric Company is terminated for having
falsely claimed entitlement to, and accepted payment
of, per diem allowances under the overnight lodging
plan.
(signed)
Robert I. Calkins
Station Superintendent
c: E.W. Collins, Jr.
On March 19 and April 2, 1986, post-discharge meetings were
held pursuant to section XVII of the collective bargaining
agreement.

The Company had conducted additional investigation

during that period and maintained its original decision to
discharge the employees.

As with the March 11 investigatory

meeting, some facts are in dispute and to the extent relevant are
referred to later in this opinion.
On May 6, 1986, a so-called reinstatement meeting was held
with respect to Gary Monte, and on May 14, 1986, Monte, one of
the employees discharged on March 13. 1986, was advised that he
was suspended in lieu of being discharged.

In a letter to Mr.

Monte of that date, the Company advised him that he was suspended
without pay for a period of "seven (7) weeks and four (4) days
for the following reasons:"
A.

Facilitating violations of the Company's per
diem overnight lodging plan including, without
limitation, the improper use and/or
distribution of valid and/or invalid motel
rece ipts.

B.

Submission of invalid motel receipts.

This suspension shall be considered as having been served
during the period of March 13 through May 6, 1986.
Sincerely,
(signed)
Robert J. O'Brien
Regional Superintendent
Substation Construction, Test
and Maintenance
The Conduct of the Employees
Gary Monte
Gary Monte entered the IMF in October, 1983, after having
worked for thirteen months for another division of the employer's
parent company, Northeast Utilities. As an IMF employee he was
assigned to the "outage" at the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant in
Waterford, Connecticut, from "at least" Monday, October 28, 1985,
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to November 22, 1985. During that period he registered at the
Riverview Motel and stayed overnight at least six days in each of
the four weeks covered by his assignment.

For each of the four

weeks he received $348 from the employer as per diem expenses
under the overnight lodging plan (6 times $50 per night) plus $48
under the meal plan which is described below."*
The employees claimed that submission of these meal receipts
was common practice which the company knew about and by its
conduct encouraged and condoned.

The Company witnesses denied

any knowledge of the practice, but Monte and others claimed that
discussions with persons involved in the reimbursement process
for the company lead to a contrary conclusion. For example, Monte
testified that Ms. Jackie DiMatos (who processed vouchers at the
West Springfield Station) advised him that he would get only
$4.75 unless he handed in receipts.

He advised her that he had

**
The payments under the meal plan are a subject of
dispute, but it is not relied on by the employer as a basis for
discharge. In relevant substance, the meal plan referred to in
these proceedings involved an employee's entitlement to a meal
supplied by the company for certain overtime work or, in lieu of
a meal, $4.75. However, for reasons not material to this
proceeding, company policy was to pay in excess of $4.75 if the
employee presented a meal receipt. The maximum the company would
pay was $8.00 on the presentation of the receipt. Each of the
grievants claimed that it was the practice of the company to pay
the meal expenses up to an amount of $8.00, whether or not a meal
actually had been consumed. Indeed, each of the grievants
admitted submitting restaurant guest checks, issued by no
restaurant, but which they filled out on checks from pads which
they possessed for that purpose. Occasionally the grievants
would use guest checks from a restaurant which they also filled
out with a sum in excess of $8.00. In neither case had they
actually eaten and paid $8.00 for the meals.

no receipts, and according to Monte, she offered to turn in two
receipts for him. Thereafter he obtained a blank check pad and
gave her receipts which she processed for payment when, as Monte
claimed, she obviously knew that the receipts were not authentic.
Others testified to similar incidents, all of which were denied
by Ms. DiMatos.
A method used by the employees to maximize the per diem
under the OLP was to share or "split" the cost of a room and each
employee splitting the cost of a room would make a claim for OLP
reimbursement at the rate of $50 per day. Thus, if the weekly
rate of a room was $160, each of two employees could pay $80 for
the room and each would receive $50 per day OLP reimbursement or
$300 for a six-day week. The Company did not claim that sharing a
room, as such, violated the collective bargaining agreement. The
Company's challenge was to those employees who neither stayed nor
were registered at the lodging and who presented lodging receipts
which purported to be, but were not issued by the motel.
Returning to Monte, he paid a full week in advance and
registered for two people at the Riverview Motel for the week of
October 28, 1985. The clerk gave him two receipts. He retained
one receipt and gave the second receipt to Kevin O'Keefe, another
IMF employee, in exchange for $80., which represented roughly
half of the weekly rate advanced by Monte for the room.

O'Keefe

also requested that Monte make a photocopy of the receipt for
him. Monte complied with the request by asking the IMF timekeeper
make a copy--in fact, two copies were made and given to 0"Keefe
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by Monte.

When he requested the copy 0"Keefe told Monte he

wanted to split his share of the room with Kevin Dowd, another
IMF employee.

At the time, Monte knew that copies of receipts

had been previously submitted and did not think it strange that
someone would want copies.
Monte also registered at the Riverview Motel for the week of
November 4, 1985. Again, he paid for the room and received two
blank receipts from the clerk. He gave one of the receipts to
0"Keefe for $80, explaining to O'Keefe that he had to split the
cost because it was too expensive.
He also registered for the week of November 11, and while
waiting for the clerk to finish the transaction, Monte became
very impatient and took two registration cards from the front
desk to use as receipts.

Monte arranged with Brian Kenney,

another IMF employee, to split the room. According to Monte,
Kenney told him that he was tired and might want a place to stay.
Kenney gave him $80., approximately half the weekly cost of the
room.

Apparently unknown to Kenney, Monte filled out the

registration cards and gave one to Kenney.
Monte testified that he called the West Springfield office
to tell them that he was going to submit a different type of
receipt (the registration card) that week, explaining that he had
received only one receipt and wanted to split the room. Monte
claims that the person he spoke to at the West Springfiield
office to either was Jackie DiMatos or Rae Selvey,

stenographers

and clerks in that office, and was told it was permissible to

submit a registration card. Although both employees denied that
had been a party to such a conversation,

Monte did submit the

card in lieu of a "receipt" and he was paid $348. The record
shows that under the standard office procedure, Ms..DiMatos would
have seen the registration card and that she did not question it,
because she must have relied on it when she prepared a voucher
for her superior (Robert Calkins) to approve payment.
Monte also registered for the week of November 18, 1985, and
again took two registration cards from the front desk. He split
the room with Earl Watson, another IMF employee,who, according to
Monte, indicated he might want a place to stay because he was
tired. In exchange for $80, he gave Watson one of the
registration cards which Monte had taken and filled out.
As was the case the previous three weeks, Montee was paid
$348 for the week.

He testified that none of the persons who

split the room with him ever stayed overnight.

Kevin O'Keefe
Kevin O'Keefe was an employee for 3 1/2 years and assigned
to the IMF for two years prior to his discharge. He was
discharged because of submissions for OLP payments for the weeks
of October 28 and November 25, 1985.
He split the cost of the room at the Riverview Motel with
Monte for the weeks beginning October 28 and November 4, 1985 by
paying Monte $80. for each week. For each week he received one of
the two receipts Monte had been given by the motel. His
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transaction with Monte has been previously described in the
course of describing Monte's

actions.

It will be recalled that O'Keefe had requested a copy of
the October 28 receipt from Monte who gave him two copies.
O'Keefe asked Kevin Dowd if he wanted to split his share of the
room for $40 so that if the weather "got bad" they would have a
place to stay. Dowd agreed and gave him $40, and O'Keefe gave
Dowd one of the copies. At this point, Monte's room was split
into three shares (Monte, 1/2; O'Keefe, 1/4; Dowd, 1/4), and each
would claim and receive payment of OLP per diem for six days or
$300 each.***
Later that day, O'Keefe had a chance encounter with David
Pellerin, another IMF employee, who asked 0"Keefe what he was
doing for a room. 0"Keefe told him that he had a "real receipt"
and suggested that Pellerin split Monte's half. 0"Keefe gave
Pellerin the second copy of the receipt and told him to pay Monte
$40.

From the evidence, it appears that Monte never became aware

of this transaction and that Pellerin did not give him $40.
O'Keefe did not split his 1/2 share of the room for the week
of November 4. He did not stay overnight at any time during the
two week period and received a total of $348 for each week as the
OLP allowance ($300) plus meal expenses ($48).

He was not

disciplined for the week of November 4.
***In passing, it should be observed that if O'Keefe and
Dowd had not claimed OLP payments, they automatically would have
received payment under the A-D travel formula or a maximum of
slightly less than $180, and they would not have expended the
$40 for the shares of the room.
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0"Kee£e was disciplined for a third OLP claim for the week
beginning November 25, 1985. This involved another IMF assignment
for which he submitted a receipt purportedly from the Golden Spur
Motel in East Lyme, Connecticut, for the week of November 25 to
December 1, 1985. He obtained this document from David Wetherall,
an IMF employee, who told 0"Keefe either that he had a room or
that he was staying at the Golden Spur and asked O'Keefe "if he
wanted to go in on it".

0"Keefe agreed and paid him $35.

According to 0"Keefe's testimony, his main concern was to have a
room available. He never stayed overnight.
Other testimony established that Wetherall had not
registered at the Golden Spur. However, Wetherall testified that
he had made some arrangements with a person called Jeff to share
some rooms.

Wetherall's conduct which was not known to O'Keefe

is described later in this opinion. There is no evidence that
O'Keefe was aware of the apparently tenuous arrangements, at
best, that Wetherall claimed to have made respect to the room.
Wetherall told O'Keefe that he was registered.
O'Keefe travelled back and forth to each of the locations
each day in a Company-supplied van which carried IMF employees
from the West Springfield home plant to the various locations.
Other employees gave similar testimony.
The significance of the use of the Company van was disputed
by the parties. The Union took the position that this Companysupplied transportation under the collective bargaining agreement
was to be provided only for persons employed prior to a time
12

provided in the agreement

(i.e., the "grandfathers") and

employees who began their empoyment after that dates (the
"grandchildren") were not to be permitted to ride the vans.
Furthermore, inasmuch as the Company and not the employee had
provided the transportation it would appear from the terms of the
contract that A-D travel payments were not authorized. Nevertheless, A-D travel expenses were paid even to those who used the
van. The Company denied there was a policy against grandchildren
riding in the van, but practically every employee who testified
stated it was his impression there was such a policy and that the
Company spread out the number of "grandfathers" among the vans so
as to provide transportation

for the grandchildren.

This was

relied on by the Union, together with the meal receipt
administration, as evidence of loose administration of employee
expense plans. The Company denied both the existence of loose
administration and its relevance to the employees' conduct with
respect to OLP claims for payment.
As noted, 0"Keefe testified that he rode the vans each day
(except when no grandfather was assigned to the site) and would
pick up his pay and per diem at the office in West Springfield on
days for which he collected the OLP allowance. This, too, is a
fact relied on the by Union with respect to O'Keefe and others as
evidence that the Company knew or should have known that
employees were not staying overnight, thereby contributing to the
employee's beliefs that, when they made their claims for the OLP
allowance, they were doing nothing wrong or nothing about which
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the Company was not aware .
O'Keefe testified that he had neither heard nor seen any
written Company policy concerning the OLP from the Company until
the written policy was distributed around February 20, 1986. On
other occasions he had handed in receipts from a campground
(Purple Mountain Campground) on a paper which did not contain the
printed name of the campground and which simply had been torn off
a common blank receipt pad. The charge was $30 for the week.
-7

He never stayed overnight, and the OLP $50 per day per diem was
paid by the Company.
O'Keefe testified that he did not believe that he was doing
anything wrong.

If he could obtain a share of a room, he would

use the OLP; if a share was not available, he would use the A-D
travel plan previously described for which no receipt was
required and which was paid automatically by the Company.
Brian Kenney
Brian Kenney was first employed by the Company in January,
1984; in September, 1984, he was transferred to the West
Springfield Station. He was certain that he had never been told
by any Company official, including Robert Calkins, the West
Springfield station supervisor, about the two different bases for
payment of travel expenses: the OLP and the A-D travel plan.
He learned about them at work from fellow employees; although he
did not name the employees with whom he spoke.

This is

consistent with the testimony of other employees, and Calkins
himself testified that he did not speak to the employees about
14

these plans.

Prior to the previously referred to February 20,

1986 memorandum, Kenney had neither seen nor heard any policy
statements from the Company concerning OLP.
In July and August, 1985, he had turned in the kinds of
receipts from the Purple Mountain Campground to which others also
had testified. He never stayed overnight and was paid the OLP
rate plus the $48. for meals.

It should be noted that several

employees had submitted receipts from the campground, that
Calkins had approved the campground and that the Company has not
relied on these OLP claims as grounds for discharge.

The Company

has urged that this has no relevance because the record contains
no evidence that the Company knew or should have known that the
employees had not stayed at the campgrounds and, in any event,
the receipts submitted actually were issued by the campground for
the amounts indicated which actually were paid by the employees
to the campground.
As its basis for discharging Kenney, the Company relied on
his transaction with Monte which has been described previously.
Kenney paid Monte $80 to split a room for the week of November
11.

In exchange, Monte gave him a filled-out registration card

which Kenney turned in to the West Springfield Station office.
During that week he rode back and forth in the Company van.

The

Company raised no question with respect to the submission of the
registration card on Monday of the week following the period
covered by the claim for per diem.

He received the OLP per diem

on Tuesday night as was the usual practice.
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Kenney's testimony with respect to the submission of meal
receipts conceded that he turned in receipts for $8.00, whether
or not he ate a meal for that amount. He filled out his own guest
checks which contained only an amount, "$8", and his signature.
He was told that this was the way things were done by his fellow
employees when he started to work at West Springfield.
Kenney also claimed he was told that the OLP was a way of
compensating grandchildren for the wage differential between
grandfathers and grandchildren. He would choose OLP over the A-D
travel plan if a room was available and he could split it.

The

message, according to Kenney, was that if you work over 50 miles
away and a campsite or motel room is available, the employee may
register, split the room and get paid the OLP allowance—he need
not stay overnight. He was told that this was the "way it was
done" and accepted by management. He felt that he had done
nothing wrong, and he had done it simply to make a few extra
dollars.
Earl Watson
Earl Watson was employed by the Company from March, 1984, to
the time of his discharge. He began working for the IMF in
August, 1984.

He acquired a registration card to be used as a

receipt from Monte for the week of November 18, 1985.

Monte told

him that he knew that this form of receipt was acceptable,
because Monte had been told by the office that it was alright and
he had used it the previous week. Watson relied on Monte's
assurance that it was valid when he agreed to share a room with
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Monte and paid him $80.

He also testified that he was glad that

Monte asked him to share a room because he was tired from
driving. Nevertheless, he never stayed overnight and attributed
his failure to stay overnight to a domestic emergency.

The card

which showed he was registered at the motel was completely filled
out when Monte gave it to him, and Kenney wrote nothing on it. He
submitted it to the Company at the West Springfield station and
received $348 for the OLP per diem and meal receipts.
Previously, in the spring of 1985, Watson had turned in
receipts from the campground which were paid. He, like others,
rode the Company van back and forth and never stayed overnight.
Watson also submitted the $8 meal receipts which took the
form of what he said had become generally known as "Earl's
receipts".
soda".

They were always for $8.50 and for a "T-bone and

In fact, according to Watson, when he failed to turn in a

receipt Jackie DiMatos had called to remind him and said she
would turn in a receipt for him.

He also related an incident

when a supervisor (Russ) had asked him for three guest checks,
and Watson gave them to him from different guest check pads which
he kept in his personal locker.
He testified that he would use the OLP in lieu of the A-D
travel plan whenever he could find someone to share a room with
him. His reason, perfectly acceptable to him, was that he could
get more money that way.
He denied any knowledge of a requirement that he had to stay
overnight in order to collect the OLP per diem.
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In fact, before

he received the February 20, 1986, memorandum he was unware of
any Company policies with respect to OLP.

His knowledge of

Company policy was derived from fellow workers who he did not
identify. In short, he did not believe that he was doing anything
wrong when he turned in the registration card without having
stayed overnight.
Michael Breton
Michael Breton worked for the Company from December, 1980,
to March, 1986, and was promoted to maintenance mechanic on the
IMF in 1982 or 1983.

Breton's discharge was based on his

submission of forms from the Golden Spur Motel for the three week
period from November 4, 1985, to November 23, 1985. He never
stayed overnight. The "receipts" were obtained from Wetherall who
indicated he would not mind if Breton shared a room with him.
Breton agreed to do so. Later in the week, upon learning that his
assignment had been extended two weeks, he asked Wetherall if he
could share the room for the entire three week period that Breton
was assigned away from the "home plant".

Wetherall assented and

arranged to have receipts for all three weeks in Breton's locker
sometime during the second week.

Breton paid $90 for the three

receipts for three weeks.
Breton inadvertently turned in the receipt for the third
week at the end of the second week and received full payment from
the Company. He testified that when he realized he had turned in
a receipt for a future week, he advised Ms. DiMatos, but she made
no comment when he told her of the error.
18

Breton claimed that he was assured by Wetherall that the
receipts were "good with the motel" and that Wetherall was
staying at the motel.

Breton believed Wetherall so that when

the Company claimed that Wetherall was not registered, he offered
to go to the motel with Wetherall to determine why he was not on
the register. As the facts will show, Wetherall never registered
at the motel and ran deals similar to the one with Breton with
other employees.
Breton described his experience, which was the same as that
of others, with the submission of receipts for Purple Mountain
Campground in the spring and fall of 1985. He testified that he
even had obtained some of those receipts for people who could not
drive out to the campground. He turned them in for OLP payment
which the Company paid without questioning him.
In addition to using the Company van during the Golden Spur
weeks, Breton also turned in meal receipts and received $8.00 per
meal when he had not purchased meals at that price. He described
some incidents and discussions with DiMatos which led him to
believe that what he was doing was proper.

At the outset of his

employment at West Springfield, when he had no receipt he would
request the flat payment authorized at that time ($4.50).
However, after he observed the practice at the station, he would
create and use "receipts" for $8.00 or more. He claimed in his
testimony that Ms. DiMatos would tell him that she would take
care of a shortage of receipts when he failed to put in a
sufficient number, and when he inadvertently submitted an
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excessive number of receipts, she told him to use them "the next
time". He also claimed he gave a supervisor (Russ) two blank
receipts at Russ' request.
He said that he had never seen or heard of a Company OLP
policy before the February 20, memorandum. Breton testified that
no Company official ever told him he had to stay overnight, but
he also conceded that no Company official told him he did not
have to stay overnight or that he could submit false documentation .
Theodore S. Williams
Theodore S. Williams worked for the Company for five years.
Williams obtained receipts from David Wetherall which covered the
Golden Spur Motel for the the three week period beginning
November 4 7 1985.

His submission of those documents and the

receipt of OLP payments provided the basis for his discharge.

He

also had obtained and turned in a receipt for a room he shared
with Wetherall for the week beginning October 28, 1985, when both
had registered at the motel and received receipts from the motel.
The Company conceded these receipts were valid receipt and did
not base discharges on this transaction.

Williams never stayed

overnight during the entire four-week period, including the week
of October 28, 1985.
Williams and Wetherall had wanted a double room which was
not available at the beginning of the week of October 28.
Apparently a double room became available on the 29th and
Wetherall asked Williams to locate some additional people to
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share the room during that week. Williams agreed to do so. Breton
and Watson indicated their interest in sharing the room and
Williams so advised Wetherall. Like Breton, Williams learned
later in the week that his asignment at Millstone was being
extended to Novemeber 23. Williams asked Wetherall if he could
share the room with him for the next three weeks and Wetherall
agreed.
Some time later during the week (after he had given Williams
two "receipts" for Breton and Watson****),

Wetherall gave

Williams three blank registration forms and asked him to fill in
that part of the information which is normally supplied by the
registrant. Williams completed them and returned them to
Wetherall who stated he would complete the Williams'
registration. Williams paid him $90 for his share of the room for
the three weeks at $30 per week. Thereafter, during the week of
November 4, Wetherall gave Williams three forms purportedly
completed by the motel, one for each week, and advised him that
he was registered. Williams asserted that he did not believe it
was strange to receive three "receipts" at one time, because this
is precisely what he had asked Wetherall to do—register him for
three weeks. Williams turned them in to the company which paid
him the OLP per diem plus the amounts for meal receipts which he

""""These receipts for Breton and Watson are not in issue in
this proceeding, but there is some evidence that Breton obtained
the receipt from Williiams and received OLP payments on that
has is.
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turned in at the same time. In fact, as with Breton and the
others, Wetherall had not registered Williams and he was not
registered himself for the three week period beginning November
4, 1985.
The assignment sheets for the weeks of November 11 and
November 18 do not show that Wetherall even was assigned to
Millstone. Although Williams had testified that he believed that
he had seen Wetherall at Millstone the week of November 11, he
conceded after being shown the assignment sheet that he may even
have been aware that Wetherall had not been assigned there that
week .
Williams testified that he believed that Wetherall had
registered him (Williams) and that he believed there was no
requirement that he stay overnight to be eligible for OLP per
diem. He described how, when the OLP first was instituted in
1984, he and others began looking for lodging possibilities which
would permit them to "capitalize on the extra money".

One place

they located was the Purple Meadow Campground which cost $30 per
week.

On his first assignment in 1984, he turned in four

receipts from the campground for four weeks of OLP per diem.
Interestingly, Northfield (the assignment location when he used
the campground) was even closer to his home than the West
Springfield Station. He stayed at home overnight and not at the
campground.
In addition, Williams testified that he rode in the Company
van and even drove it sometines. He claimed that Calkins, who he
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presumed supplied it, saw him and spoke to him when he was in the
van. According the Williiams, there were mostly grandchildren in
the van. Furthermore, he commonly received the previous week's
OLP payments together with his paycheck on the night of a day
when he would later put in for OLP payments.
With the apparent belief that he had to be registered to
collect OLP and the further belief that it was necessary to share
the room to economically benefit from the OLP, Williams testified
that in a week when he could find no one to share a room, he
received A-D travel money and did not apply for OLP per diem.
That week, he also rode in the company van.
Williams related an incident with respect to meal receipts
and Ms. DiMatos similar to that of other employees. He testified
that when he was short, she turned in two meal receipts for him.
He also related an incident with Bill Balsam, a maintenance
supervisor, who, after some dispute about whether the men would
be supplied meals which was resolved by permitting them to turn
in receipts for reimbursement, expressed the wish that the men
would not put in consecutive numbered receipts as others had
done .
Williams testified that no Company representative
except Ms. DiMatos had spoken to him about OLP per diem.

He had

never seen any Company policy statement until on or after
February 20.

He conceded that no Company official had told him

he could turn in false receipts, but, on the other hand, he
claimed he believed the receipts he submitted to the Company were
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genuine.
Kevin R. Dowd
Kevin Dowd had been employed by the Company for four years
prior to his discharge.

The grounds for his discharge were the

payments he claimed and received on (1) the basis of the
previously described Riverview Motel receipt obtained from Monte
through O'Keefe for the week of October 28 in exchange for $40.
and (2) a Golden Spur receipt obtained from David Wetherall for
the week of November 25 in exchange for $30.
Dowd's description of how he obtained the Riverview receipt
is substantially the same as that provide by O'Keefe which has
been previously set forth in this opinion. Dowd filled in his own
name on the receipt.

He paid O'Keefe $40, which represented 1/2

of O'Keefe's 1/2 (or $80) share.
As for the Golden Spur receipt, it was the product of
Wetherall asking Dowd if he wanted to share a room and Wetherall
assuring Dowd he would register him. He was not certain, but did
believe, that Wetherall delivered the receipt to him all filled
out. He paid him $30. Dowd never actually asked Wetherall

if he,

Dowd, had been registered; he assumed that he was because
Wetherall had said he would register him.
He turned in both the Riverview and Golden Spur receipts for
OLP payments which he received together with meal payments. Dowd
did not stay overnight during either week. He testified that
unless he was fatigued, he did not intend to stay overnight. He
also testified that on other occasions, he had paid for space at
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the Purple Mountain Campground ($30/week) and received full OLP
reimbursement without staying

overnight.

As with other employees, Dowd related an incident with Ms.
DiMatos concerning meal receipts and also testified that,
although not a "grandfather", he rode in the Company van with the
apparent knowledge of Calkins. When he rode in the van, he also
had turned in receipts from the campground and the Golden Spur
Motel. As for the meal receipts, he testified that on one
occasion he had only four receipts and told her just to pay him
the automatic $4.75 for the other two meals.

She told him not to

worry about it, and he was paid $8.00 for each meal.
There were occasions when he rode the van and received the
A-D travel allowances plus meals. He denied that the OLP payments
and A-D payments were different in that to obtain OLP the
employee had to stay overnight.

He made his choice on the basis

of which would provide him with the larger amount and whether or
not a room was available which he could share. However, he said
he never actively sought a room. The Riverview Motel submission
was the first he ever made, and he claimed he would not have done
so if he had not been asked by Monte.
Dowd also testified that he never submitted a meal receipt
without having a meal.

Further, no Company representative ever

told him he had to stay overnight to collect OLP payments.

Prior

to the February 20 statement, there had been no written Company
policy of which he was aware. As of the time he testified, he
stated that he had not read the collective bargaining agreement,
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although he did have a copy.
William A Smith
William Smith had been employed by the Company for six years
and three months and had been assigned to the IMF since January
21, 19807 when he was discharged. He had served as the Union
Steward for IMF employees since May, 1983, until his discharge
on March 13, 1986.
He is the only employee who claimed to have had any direct
dealings with Calkins, the West Springfield Station supervisor,
with respect to the OLP.

According to Smith, he had many

discussions on a variety of subjects with Calkins in an informal
format which Smith claimed Calkins referred to as "chit-chat"
sessions. These meetings usually were grievance meetings.
Smith testified that in the summer of 1984, at Calkins'
request, he met with him in one of these chit-chats to discuss
the newly adopted collective bargaining agreement, including the
new OLP provisions. Smith testified he was unaware of the
contract provisions concerning the OLP when he agreed to the
meeting.

Although he had voted to approve the collective

bargaining agreement, Smith said he was not present when the OLP
provisions were explained to the rank and file and he had not
been consulted during the negotiations. In passing, it is noted
that no testimony was presented concerning what was told the rank
and file about the OLP when the agrement was submitted to them.
As Smith described that meeting, Calkins expressed regret
about the rate reduction for some of the employees, but he
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represented that he was able to get the employees $50 per day,
regardless of cost, for lodging, plus the $8.00 meal plan.

Smith

said that he inquired of Calkins about how the employees could
obtain the $50 per day and was told all they need do is hand in
valid hotel or motel receipts.

As for other modes of lodging,

Calkins said it was then "up in the air", but from his viewpoint
he thought they could be "looking at such things as campgrounds
and private citizens' homes". He said he woul have to discuss it
with Eddie Collins (a Union official).

In any event, with the

payment of $50 per day regardless of cost, Smith said that
Calkins expressed the hope that this narrowed the gap between
grandfathers and grandchildren. Smith also testified that just
before Calkins took over as supervisor at West Springfield, he
had stated he would make things "hunky-dory" for the "grandchildren, because they had been getting the "short end of the
stick".
Smith testified that he also asked Calkins about the
necessity of an employee staying overnight to be eligible for
payment. Smith said that Calkins responded: " 'No. Employee will
not have to stay over night. I, myself, personally don't care
where he hangs his hat or put his shoes underneath, it's not my
concern, he paid monies to a motel, money for the rental of
space.'"

A little later in his testimony Smith said Calkins had

flatly said the employees need not stay overnight to collect OLP
payments. Other than this conversation, Smith had not heard or
seen any Company policy prior to the February 20, 1986, written
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policy statement. Sometime after his conversation with Calkins,
Smith received a copy of the 1984 collective bargaining
agreement, but he claimed he only "breezed" through it because he
knew Calkins' policy and was not concerned with the agreement.
Calkins, in his testimony, contradicted Smith and said that
Smith always appeared with the contract in his hand. He also
denied that he used the term "chit-chat".

For his part, Smith

denied that he went to the "chit-chats" with the contract in his
hand and insisted Calkins had confused him with someone else who
looked like him, one, Ronald Greeney.
Smith also related two other incidents with Calkins. One was
a later inquiry from Calkins asking how the men liked the new
policy.

The other involved another employee, Clyde Brown, who,

in the fall of 1984, had an initial two week assignment to
Northfield and had paid the entire two weeks in advance for a
motel room, when it appeared the assignment would end earlier.
Brown was concerned that he would lose the money he had laid out.
According to Smith, when he approached Calkins about the problem,
Calkins told him that even if the assignment ended earlier, he
would reimburse Brown at the rate of $50 per day (the OLP rate)
and not just for Brown's cost.

Brown testified that Smith had

advised him of Calkins response.
Smith also said that he had discussed meal receipts with
Calkins frequently. On one occasion, Calkins explained that the
receipts were necessary even if no meal had been consumed in
order to satisfy D.P.U. audits. On another occasion, according to
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Smith, Calkins told Smith to tell his "union brothers" to show
some "style" on meal receipts and not to be so obvious by turning
them in with the numbers in sequence."***"

Another time Calkins

complained to Smith about $11 and $12 for meals requested by some
non-IMF employees and pointed out that the IMF people ate for $8.
Smith remonstrated with Calkins pointing out that he could not
really believe people were actually buying a meal for $87 and he
must know that they were not eating meals when they turn in a
receipt for $8.
Smith also testified about his experiences with Ms. DiMatos
and meal receipts. On one occasion, he said, he had turned in six
receipts when he was entitled to five; DiMatos told him to save
the extra one for the "next time".

Another time, he turned in

five when he was entitled to six, and Smith said she took care of
the sixth meal claim. On still another occasion, he turned in two
receipts when he would have been entitled to payment for three
meals; DiMatos arranged to have him paid for the third meal,
although he had consumed and paid for no meal.
Smith testified that he has been paid on the basis of OLP
and A-D travel and rode the Company van regardless of the basis
on which he was paid. He had been paid an approxiamtely equal
number of times on the basis of OLP and A-D travel. He used OLP

"""""There also was some testimony concerning the settlement
of a grievance concerning meal entitlement. I do not consider the
settlement either relevant or competent to prove a practice of
payment without receipts or without a requirement that the meals
for which reimbursement is sought must have been paid for by the
employee.
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when he was able to share a room; otherwise he accepted the
automatic payments under the A-D travel plan.

Smith conceded

that he knew that under the pre-1984 agreement, the only basis
for payment was the A-D plan with had no provision for payment
for overnight stays.
Smith had been paid at the OLP rate for receipts from a
campground in Connecticut, which Calkins had approved. He also
was paid for a receipt turned in after he was discharged. This
receipt was for a room shared by three people, and none of them
had stayed overnight. He submitted the receipt, he explained,
because the post-discharge

discussions with the Company gave him

the impression it was not concerned with whether or not he
stayed. When he turned it in, the Company did not ask if he had
stayed overnight, but was concerned only with the form of the
receipt.
The grounds for Smith's discharge was Smith's submission of
a "receipt" which he had received from Wetherall for the Golden
Spur Inn in exchange for $30 for the week beginning November 25,
1985. According to Smith, he met Wetherall and told him he was
interested in sharing a room and might stay one or two nights.
Wetherall had him fill out a registration card which he took and
said he would see to it that Smith was registered. Smith's
recollection was that Wetherall had not said that Wetherall was
registered, but rather that he had rented a room. The next day
Wetherall told him that he (Smith) was registered and gave him a
receipt on which Wetherall said the motel had made the entries.
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He received no key, but was told to contact Wetherall if he
needed access to the room. As with the other "receipts" supplied
by Wetherall, the entries had not been made by the motel. Smith
paid him $30 and submitted the receipt for OLP payment which the
Company paid.

David R. Pellerln
David Pellerin worked for the Company about 3 1/2 years and
was assigned to IMF for about thirty months before he was
discharged. His discharge was based on his claims to OLP payments
for having stayed at the Riverview Motel, the Golden Spur Motel
and the White House Motel. For the periods he submitted OLP
claims, he never intended to and never did stay overnight at
those places.
He submitted three claims concerning the Riverview Motel:
the photocopy of the receipt he received from Kenney and which
was described earlier in this opinion and two

purported receipts

for two additional weeks. It will be recalled that Monte had made
copies of a receipt issued by the Riverview Motel which he gave
to Kenney and Kenney gave one of those copies to Pellerin with
the admonition that Pellerin pay Monte $40 for 1/2 of Monte's 1/2
share of the room Monte occupied. Pellerin took the receipt and
submitted it for and received OLP payment for the week of October
28, 1985. Pellerin never stayed at the motel during that week, he
never spoke to Monte and he did not pay Monte anything.

He also

conceded that he might have received the receipt after the week
was over.
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The additional two submissions for the Riverview Motel
were for the weeks of November 4 and December 2, 1985.

Pellerin

claimed that a person called Gibson who he had met in 1983, gave
him a blank regisration card for which he paid $30.

Pellerin did

not know where Gibson worked and did not know where he lived.
Gibson told him that he was not staying at the Riverview,•**""*
but provided Pellerin with a blank Riverview receipt shortly
after their first conversation.

The first conversation took

place towards the end of the week of November 4, and it is
probable Pellerin received a blank receipt at the beginning of
the following week. Pellerin filled in the receipt to reflect a
payment of $90. and also signed the hotel clerk's name. He denied
that he signed her name to deceive the Company, but explained
that he thought it should be on the receipt because her name
appeared on the receipt which he had submitted previously.
The manner in which he acquired the receipt for the week of
December 2, according to Pellerin, was substantially the same as
for November 4. He also filled in the blanks on this paper;
however, he did not sign the clerk's name--the space was left
blank. The Company paid him OLP per diem for October 28, November
4 and December 2.
Pellerin also obtained a receipt from Wetherall for the
Golden Spur Motel for the week of November 25.

Pellerin

***"**"*"It is unclear from the testimony whether Gibson told
him he was not staying at the motel when they engaged in the
transaction or whether Gibson told him sometime later that he had
not stayed at the motel.
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testified that he paid Wetherall $30 and received a receipt which
was completely filled out. He also testified that Wetherall told
him that he was staying at the motel.
Pellerin turned in a "receipt" for the White House Motel for
the week of February 3, 1986, which he said he had obtained from
a Mr. Manela with whom he had agreed to share the room for what
Pellerin believed to be $30.

Pellerin claimed that he had turned

in a similar receipt for a prior week and was paid.

The receipt

was filled with erasures on practically every line which Pellerin
claimed were on the receipt when he received it. When he turned
in the receipt for February 3, it contained the handwritten name
and street address of the motel, but not the city or state.
During his testimony on November 5, he was ordered by the
arbitrator to provide the location. He did so, although up to
that time he had refused to give the Company the information.
He also testified that he knew that Manela stayed at the
White House Motel because shortly after his discharge he went to
the motel and asked the clerk who he said affirmed that Manela
had stayed at the motel. After learning where the motel was
located, the Company obtained a written statement from the owner
who would not appear at the hearing. The statement was received
over a hearsay objection. The statement, in substance, said that
there was a White House Motel at 130 East High Street and the
owner's mother's house was located at 140 East High Street.
Manela (spelled Mannella in the statement) and his wife had
rented the house at 130 East High Street with the understanding
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they could not rent lodging space or entertain or allow visitors
to stay overnight. David Pellerin, according to the statement,
did not stay at the motel or the house overnight. The handwritten
name and address on the receipt which Pellerin said was on it
when he received it was 140 East High Street, not the motel, but
the address of the owner's mother's house.
While this Arbitrator is reluctant to admit hearsay on what
the parties view as an important issue of fact, I am inclined to
and will consider the statement of the owner offered by the
Company for two principal reasons; (1) the Union itself relied on
Pellerin's hearsay testimony concerning the statement by the
clerk to the effect that Manela had stayed at the motel; and (2)
the refusal to reveal the location of the motel for no apparent
reason served to hamper the Company's efforts to investigate the
matter and, perhaps, its ability to provide the evidence in a
different form.
In addition to the earlier White House Motel receipt which
Pellerin said he had submitted, he also testified that he had
turned in receipts from the Purple Mountain Campground which were
paid by the Company on an OLP basis. He also turned in and was
paid for meal receipts for meals not eaten and receipts which he
created. In this connection, he stated that he did not think
signing the Riverview Motel clerk's name to a receipt was any
worse than signing a clerk's name and and placing an amount on a
meal receipt.
Pellerin also confirmed that the van was readily available
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for use by IMF personnel. He also testified that a supervisor,
Balsam, told the employees to use some discretion with respect to
submission of meal receipts and not put them in "chronological
order" (probably, numerical sequence). He claimed that no Company
spokesman had spoken to him about Company policy under OLP and
that before the February 20, 1986, writing, he had seen no
written policy statement.

David Wetherall
David Wetherall was called to testify by the Company. He
began working for the Company in April, 1985, and was assigned to
the IMF in the summer of 1985.

He supplied receipts purported to

be from the Golden Spur Motel to Smith, Dowd, Pellerin and
O'Keefe, as well as Williams.

He neither worked with nor

socialized with the first four named employees. His only contact
with them was at the plant.

Wetherall, at Williams' suggestion

they share a room, registered with Williams at the Golden Spur
Motel for the week of October 28, 1985. Each paid the motel and
received a receipt.

The room had only one bed and Wetherall

testified that he occupied it on the night of Monday, October 28.
He spent the rest of the week at a friend's house.
Michael Westkamper, a friend of Wetherall, testified that
Wetherall stayed with Westkamper and his family at Westkamper's
home in Connecticut during the weeks of Halloween and
Thanksgiving and other times as well. He denied that he had ever
previously spoken to Wetherall or the Union about Wetherall's
discharge.
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At the end of the first week, Wetherall said that he and
Williams discussed sharing a room the week of November 4.
Wetherall gave Williams a blank registration card and, in fact,
probably gave him more than one blank to fill out because he
wanted the room for more than one week.
forms and returned them to Wetherall.

Williams completed the
Wetherall testified that

he, in turn, gave them to someone called "Jeff" who returned them
with the receipt data completed.

Wetherall gave them to Williams
T

and made arrangements for Williams to stay with Jeff.

However,

he never mentioned Jeff to Williams (or to any of the other
employees). He did tell Williams that he was registered at the
motel. Wetherall said that he gave Jeff $120—$30 for Wetherall's
share for one week and $90 for Williams' share for one week.
Wetherall did not stay at the motel again, but testified that he
stayed with his friend.
According to Wetherall, the blanks were obtained from Jeff,
who Wetherall said was someone he had met the previous week when
Jeff had no place to stay.

Wetherall gave him the key to the

Wetherall-Williams room and permitted him to use it the week of
October 28.
Wetherall related a substantially similar arrangement with
respect to each of the other employees previously identified as
having obtained receipts from Wetherall.

He never mentioned Jeff

to any of them and testified that he believed there were four or
five rooms which they were sharing with Jeff and some of Jeff's
fellow employees.

Jeff never was called as a witness.
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Wetherall submitted three receipts from the Golden Spur on
his own behalf for the weeks of October 28, November 4 and
November 25.

Only the latter two were claimed as grounds for

discharge. Wetherall claimed he was sharing rooms with Jeff and
the others and these were receipts supplied to him by Jeff. Both
receipts bore the same receipt number and the motel clerk
testified that the receipts were never and could not have been
issued by the motel.

They were simply counterparts of one

receipt which the motel records showed were never issued,
Additional Union Evidence on Employees' Conduct
Except where noted, the foregoing was derived from the
testimony of the employees themselves.
offered to support their testimony.

Additional evidence was

Dennis Waite, a current

employee, testified that when he was interviewed for a position
by Mr. Stevens, Calkins predecessor as supervisor of the West
Springfield Station, Stevens told him that he would have to use
his own automobile for travel.

However, that same day

when he

met with LoGrande, a foreman, LoGrande told him, on the "QT"
(LoGrande's words), that the Company really supplied the vehicle
and he would get per diem even if he used the Company vehicle;
they looked the other way.

Stevens saw LoGrande while he was in

the van on many occasions.
Vaite also testified with respect to the creation and
submission of meal receipts and said that even supervisors (Lo
Grande- and Bragdon) had asked him for receipts.

Another

employee, Steven Goodrow, testified that when he was Interviewed
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by Calkins, Calkins told him about the use of the van and the
grandfather clause.

Calkins told him that it was alright to ride

in the van, " 'except I [Calkins} don't know anything about it.'"
THE COMPANY WITNESSES
The Company called the persons in charge of the records
of the Riverview Motel and the Golden Spur Motel.

After two days

of testimony and intensive cross-examination, it was clear and as
a practical matter admitted that the receipts and registration
7

cards which the Company had claimed had not been issued by the
respective motels had, in fact, not been issued by the motels. An
extensive investigation report by Mr. De Fillippo of Company
security was received in evidence. In addition, Mr. De Fillippo
testified about his investigation and how he learned that certain
employees had not been registered with the motels and had
submitted documents not issued by the motels. His report, of
course, is hearsay as was some of his testimony, but there was
non-hearsay testimony on every material aspect of his testimony
(except the previously discussed White House Motel testimony).
Indeed, the substance of his testimony as well as of the motel
clerks was confirmed by the employees themselves.
Much of the testimony of the Company witnesses consisted of
outright denials of the truth of the testimony by the discharged
employees.

Ms. Rae Selvey, a clerk at West Springfield, denied

that she ever had a conversation with anyone about turning in
photocopies of registration cards.

Anything to do with OLP she

would have turned over to someone else in the office.
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Ms. Jackie DiMatos, a senior clerk stenographer in the West
Springfield office, handled the administrative process in that
office for OLP, meal reimbursement and travel payments. She
prepared the vouchers for Calkins' approval based on the
documents submitted by the employees.

During the period in

question, she would retain in her possession the OLP
documentation and merely enter the information on the voucher.
Calkins would not see those documents.
DiMatos testified that she had no reason to believe they
were not valid receipts and did not question employees concerning
their submisssions.

However, after the Company issued its

February 20 policy statement on OLP, Calkins asked to see the
papers submitted in support of OLP payment claims.

Although she

at first denied that Calkins had ever expressed regret about
following the practices of the previous station supervisor, a
claim made by a Union witness, she did concede that Calkins
mentioned that it was "unfortunate" or that he did "regret"
continuing some old practices.
Ms. DiMatos also flatly denied that there was any truth at
all to the testimony

by Smith. Dowd, Monte, Breton, Pellerini,

Williams and Watson concerning her putting in meal slips for
$8.00 for them.

She admitted that she might have called people

to remind them to put in for their meals, but she did this in
order to avoid retyping vouchers.

She testified that she knew of

no employees who made claims for meals not eaten or who
maintained a supply of guest check pads for the purpose of making
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meal claims.

She also testified that she never told an employee

it was unnecssary to eat a meal in order to be reimbursed.
A number of supervisors also were called by the Company and
uniformly testified that they were unaware of any practice or
policy which permitted employees to turn in bogus meal checks for
reimbursement. Where an employee had claimed that a supervisor
had asked the employee for a guest check, each of
those supervisors denied that he had done so.

Evidence Concerning Negotiations and
the March 11 Investigatory Meeting
The Union, and the Company in response, offered extensive
testimony concerning events at the March 11, 1986,

investigatory

meeting and the post-discharge meetings held on March 19 and
April 2, 1986. The essence of the Union's claim with respect to
these meetings is that damaging admissions were made by the
Company during those meetings, either explicitly or implicitly.
The Company, of course, denies that there were such admissions.
The key Company admission claimed by the Union is that at
the March 11 investigatory meeting Calkins admitted that the
employees did not have to stay overnight in order to collect OLP
payments.

For this contention, many of the employees and the

Union representatives present at the meeting testified that in
response to a question by Mr. Villano, who was in charge of the
Company representation at the meeting, which inquired of Calkins
whether the employees had to stay overnight, Calkins said they
did not have to stay overnight.
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Calkins testified that if he

addressed the question at all (and he denied that he said it) he
probably was saying that the employees were not required to stay
overnight, but that they could come home.

He was not saying that

they could collect OLP payments if they did not stay overnight.
The statement he allegedly made does not appear in Calkins'
notes taken at the meeting. Union representative Krause who was
present at the meeting testified that she took notes at the
meeting, but they were not offered by the Union at the hearing.
Several employees testified that Calkins made some
statements during the post-discharge section XVII meetings or the
March 11 investigatory meeting to the effect that he did not care
where they slept; his concern was receiving a valid receipt.
Calkins denies that he made such statements as a license to
collect OLP without staying overnight; indeed, he denies making
the statements altogether.
In addition to the statements Calkins is alleged to have
made at the March 11 and section XVII meetings, the Union claims
that the questions asked of the employees at the March 11 meeting
evidence that the Company itself did not consider it necessary
that the employees stay overnight to collect OLP payments.

In

particular, some of the Union witnesses testified that they were
not asked about whether they had stayed overnight, but were asked
to explain why they did not appear on the motel registers.

On

the basis of this kind of question, the Union urges the inference
that the company's interst was in registration and not staying
overnight.

The Company denies that, even if the question was
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asked in this form, the inference to be drawn is the one for
which the Union contends. In addition, the Company claims that
the employees were asked about staying overnight and Calkins'
notes confirm it.**"""***
The Arbitrator notes that some of the employee witnesses did
not testify with as much certainty as others as to whether they
were asked about registration or staying.

Further, a question

concerning the absence of a person's name from the motel register
would be the natural first question in any examination of a
witness even if the ultimate concern was whether the person had
stayed overnight at the motel.
Mr. Collins, the Union business manager, testified with
respect contract to negotiations and the investigatory and postdischarge meetings previously described.

He agreed that the OLP

was in response to the Union's demand to increase "D" of the A-D
travel plan to a flat $60 without staying overnight. He conceded
that a Company "summary of agreements" accurately reflected the
agreement on that issue which was the clause that became part of
the 1984 collective bargaining agreement.
He also testified that there was not a great deal of
discussion about the subject, except for some inquiry by him
concerning the approval of places to stay.

In response to a

**"»"**The Union has contended that the notes were not taken
by Calkins, but rather by Mr. Merchant, another Company
representative at the March 11 meeting. Calkins testified they
were his notes and Ms. DiMatos testified that she typed them.
I have already noted that Ms. Krause's notes were never offered
by the Union.
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question by the Arbitrator as to whether Mr. Collins had inquired
about "going back and forth and not staying over at all",

Mr.

Collins responded that there was no discussion of that point, but
there was some talk "about whether or not somebody was not there
every night". However, he said that he was quite "vague" about
the details.

Mr. Collins also said there was some discussion

about whether a person might stay over with a friend, that is,
"rent" a room from him and submit a receipt. Calkins responded it
could be acceptable.

However, Collins said there had been no

discussion about anyone being eligible for OLP reimbursement
without incurring the cost of renting a room.

Collins testified

that when these subjects were discussed, Calkins expressed his
sympathy for the employees on the lower of a two-tier wage and
benefit scheme and while "winking and giving an aye (sic) sign",
said he would see to it that the men were taken care of where he
had discretion.
Contentions of the Parties and Discussion
The Union's Contentions
The Union contends that the Company breached the collective
bargaining agreement for several reasons: the "employees, in
fact, did nothing improper"; the Company retroactively applied
unilaterally-implemented rules; the discipline was discriminatory; the Company failed fairly to investigate the allegations
before imposing punishment; discharge was too severe a
punishment, in any event; and the Company, not the employees, has
"dirty hands".
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The core of the Union's case, according to the Union's
brief, is that the ten employees were disciplined for conduct
which they had no reason to believe was improper, and the Company
never put the employees on notice that they should not do what
they did, "much less that discharge would be the consequence for
such doings", (p.3). The Union states that the basic fact
question is whether the employees "reasonably" believed they were
complying with the OLP requirements.

The Union concludes that

the employees did have a reasonable belief and that the Company's
conduct led them to that belief and then punished them
without prior notice of a change in the rules.
The Company's Contentions.
The Company contends: the express terms of the collective
bargaining agreement require employees to stay overnight and
present a valid motel/hotel receipt and the discharged employees
did neither; the Union failed to establish that the Company by
its conduct waived any of the requirements of the OLP provision;
the claim that the Company did not engage in a proper
investigation is belied by the facts; there was no application of
a retroactive standard, because the employees submitted bogus
receipts and this always was prohibited.
Discuss ion
The Company contends that discharge was justified because
the discharged employees submitted false claims for OLP payments
in that they did not stay overnight at the lodgings and the
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documentation was not valid but, indeed, false. The Union claims
that the Company had waived any requirement that employees stay
overnight or had condoned the misconduct, if it was such.
There has been no contention that the contractual language
which by its explicit terms requires overnight stay and a valid
receipt in order to collect does not mean precisely that-claimants for OLP payments must stay overnight and present valid
motel receipts.

The Company has sustained its burden of

establishing that the employees did not stay overnight and that
the employees submitted documentation of their stay or
registration which was not issued by the motels.

I need not

decide if there are circumstances under which an overnight stay
would not be required under the terms of the contract or even if
an overnight stay is required at all.

The parties' positions in

this proceeding make that decision unnecessary.

The Union's

claim is that the Company by its conduct led the employees to
believe that they need not stay overnight.

Viewed as a claim of

waiver or condonation or both, the Union has the burden of
establishing these defenses.
It is necessary for the Union to show that the company
intended to and did communicate to the employees or by its
conduct led the employees reasonably to believe that they did not
have to stay overnight in order to collect OLP payments and that
they could submit the kind of documentation that they did submit.
The Union relies on three major kinds of evidence to sustain its
position.
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First, statements allegedly made by Calkins which indicated
his indifference as to where or whether they stayed overnight so
long as they had a valid receipt; second, an atmosphere of loose
administration of other aspects of the contract which created or
contributed to the belief the OLP would be administered in the
same way: and third, a claim that the Company was aware or
apparently aware that the employees were engaging in the conduct
which are the grounds for discharge, as evidenced particularly by
the acceptance of similar documentation in the past.
The Union recognizes that for total exoneration based on
waiver or reliance, the beliefs of the employees must have been
reasonable and the cause of the belief must be the Company's
conduct.

Assuming arguendo, that the employees actually believed

that what they did was authorized, it still would be necessary to
establish that the belief was reasonable and that the belief was
attributable to the Company in order to conclude that there had
been a waiver or reliance.
To begin with, it is necessary to identify the "belief"
which it is contended these employees held.

It was not simply a

belief that if they rented a hotel room and paid the rate and
went home to sleep that night for some reason or perhaps no
reason that they would be entitled to collect OLP payments.
The belief in question must be defined by what they did.

As a

practical matter and as matter of intention, they were not
renting a room or even space. They were purchasing a right or an
avenue to the collecting OLP payments. They had created a mini46

avenue to the collecting OLP payments. They had created a minimarket in the right to collect OLP payments.

This was a profit-

making enterprise in that the more people that "shared" a room,
the greater would be the profit for each participant as the cost
of his share declined and the reward (OLP payments) remained
constant. The employees were quite frank about it when they
testified they simply elected between OLP and A-D travel
allowances using the simple measure of which gave them the most
money.

The decision had nothing to do with sleeping

accommodations or their rental. This was the belief held by the
employees.
Was the belief reasonable and was the Company's conduct the
source of that belief?

Let us address the last part of this

question first. One of the claimed sources of the belief is
Calkins.

Yet, except for Smith and Collins, none of the

employees identified any supervisor or management person who
prior to the time he submitted his claims said he need not stay
overnight or that he may submit receipts which werenot issued by
a hotel or motel. Those who did identify a source for their
belief claimed they learned it from unidentified fellow
employees. The Company cannot be charged with the conduct of
those fellow employees without a more compelling showing than is
present in this record.
As for Calkins' discussions with Smith and Collins which are
detailed earlier in this opinion, even the report of those
conversations by Smith and Collins (which Calkins denies took
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place) do not establish that merely purchasing a bare "share" in
a room without staying or even for the purpose of using it, as is
the situation in this proceeding, would be acceptable.

Moreover,

nothing in those conversations suggests that false documents for
OLP could or would be accepted. At most, the evidence shows that
Calkins was not going to monitor the personal sleeping habits of
the men, but he did not suggest there need not be at least a good
faith acquisition of a room for actual

use.

There was considerable testimony with respect to statements
at the March 11 investigatory meeting and the section XVII
meetings.

It is apparent that the grievants cannot contend they

relied on statements during those meetings as Company conduct
they relied on when they submitted their OLP claims. However,
those statements

(if they were made) could circumstantially tend

to establish the Company's state of mind during the earlier
period when the employees were submitting claims or they could be
admissions that staying overnight was not a requirement.
I find that there has been a failure to establish that the
Company admitted that there was no need to stay overnight.
testimony of some of the employee witnesses, as well as

The

Collins

and Kielty, contained elements of uncertainty and in combination
with the failure to produce or adequately account for the failure
to produce Ms. Krause's notes serve to dilute some of the more
positive testimony by other employees. Mr. Calkins' notes of the
March 11 meeting and his not implausible explanation he gave of
the statements to which the Union witnesses were alluding
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constitute a significant counterweight to the more categorical
statements of those witnesses. What one hears often is shaped by
an interest as an advocate or in one's self.

In this case, there

can be no certainty as to what was said, particularly where there
are no neutral witnesses, all of the witnesses have a strong
interest in the outcome and the most honest memories, in some
way, are shaped by desire. Consequently, I am compelled to
conclude that the evidence does not establish that the Company
took a position totally at odds with its position at the hearing
and with the contract language.
Turning to the alleged loose administration of other travel
and meal plans as a basis for fostering the employees' belief, I
do find that the meal plan was loosely administered and the
Company's witnesses total denial of the truth of every statement
on the subject by the Union witnesses casts doubt on the
credibility of the Company witnesses on this subject.

I find

that the meal plan was loosely administered probably with the
knowledge or wilful ignorance of supervisory personnel.

However,

neither the loose administration of the meal plan nor the
permission of grandchildren to use the company van are sufficient
in themselves to lead reasonably to the belief that the minimarket kind of practice with respect to lodging was acceptable.
Moreover, A-D travel allowances which required no overnight stay
was easily available.

This fact more rationally leads to the

conclusion that the requisites for compliance with OLP had to be
observed in more than a merely formal way of purchasing a
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minority share in a room that was not used and was never intended
to be used.
As for the claim that the Company's administration of the
OLP plan itself somehow led to the employees' belief they could
act as they did requires ignoring some facts and engaging in
bootstrap reasoning. First, there were many employees submitting
OLP claims who apparently actually used the lodgings.

The report

by DeFillipo indicates as much. Consequently the Company was
processing many claims, some in compliance with the contract and
some which were not. It would be difficult to distinguish among
claims if the documents all appear to be legitimate and are
represented to be so. Second, it certainly cannot be said that by
processing a false claim without knowledge of its falsity, the
Company has misled the person who files the false claim or has
waived its rights or condoned the misdeed.
I conclude, therefore, that if the employees held the belief
that they could engage in the conduct with which they are charged
the belief was not one reasonably held on the basis of all the

o

facts and ws not attributable to the Company's conduct. Moreover,
^

this was neither Company policy nor did the Company intend to
convey that it was Company policy. Indeed, one of the most
puzzling aspects of the Union's position is that, except for
Calkins, there is no evidence of any management source for the
claimed employees' belief. There is no evidence of what the
employees were told when the contract was ratified and apparently
not one employee thought it fitting to consult the contract or to
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ask a question about the remarkable bonanza to be found in the
OLP provision.

It appears there may have been a desire not to

know the answer.
Having concluded that the belief was not reasonably held is
not the end of the inquiry, because the belief nevertheless
actually may have been held, albeit unreasonably. I am inclined
to the view that some of the employees did believe they were
permitted to engage in some of the conduct which served as
grounds for their discharge.

Sometimes the belief bordered on

wilful ignorance, but it was believed nevertheless.
A common thread runs through eight of the employees, i.e.,
the necessity that there actually be a room available and that
the documentation be authentic. Only two employees do not satisfy
these criteria--Wetherall and Pellerin.

I find Wetherall's tale

about Jeff to be incredible and have grave doubts that he even
stayed at the Westkamper home, although it is not particularly
material whether he did or not.

Similarly, I find Pellerin was
g
willing to and did create documents and also claimed beijnfits
without even actually paying for a share (as was the case with
Monte's Riverview receipt).

Both of these employees knowingly

dealt with false documents concerning non-existent accommodations
and their discharges are justified and should be affirmed.
Williams, Smith, Dowd, O'Kee^rfe, and Breton played the minimarket game to the very edge although there are some variations
among them.

Each acquired at least one share in a room at a cost

which if the room actually was to be used by each person who had
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an interest, it would resemble the little car used by clowns in
the circus. In some instances, there was not even an actual room,
but they did not know it. However, I do find that they believed
there was an actual room and believed they were registered.
I also find they did not believftheir documents to be false. I
think they also believed, albeit erroneously and unreasonably,
that the Company had no objection to their practices. They were
extremely negligent, but not malevolent. Consequently, their
punishment should not be as severe as a discharge. A long-term
suspension without pay would be appropriate.
It is difficult to distinguish Kenney and Watson from Monte.
Monte's conduct does involve some facilitation of the minimarket, but not to the extent engaged in by the five employees
previously discussed.

Monte actually used the room he rented and

if those who purchased a share wanted to use it there is nothing
in the record which indicates they could not do so.

On the face

of it, Kenney and Watson simply shared a room with Monte and
submitted a non-authentic receipt which they reasonably could and
did believe was authentic.

Yet, it is clear they had no

intention of using the room except as a means of collecting OLP
payments.

They are less culpable than the others, because of the

single and less aggravated abuse of the system in which they
engaged.

There is no illusion that measurements of punishment

are or can be precise; however, they are so close to Monte's
situation that I conclude their discharges should be set aside,
they be suspended without pay for the same period as Monte, and
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reinstated

with back-pay for the period beginning with

termination of the suspension, subject to the limits on the award
on back-pay contained

in the collective bargaining agreement.

In short, under the well-settled principle that employees
similary situated should be similarly disciplined, Kenney and
Watson should receive the same penalty as Monte.
The foregoing is intended to deal with the Union's
contentions concerning waiver, condonation and detrimental
reliance.

The disposition also reflects the Arbitrator's

conclusions concerning

contentions that punishment was too

severe and that distinctions should be made among levels of
culpability.

The claim that there was a retroactive application

of rules also is covered by the foregoing findings. There is no
merit to the claim that there was an insufficient investigation by the Company, and the Arbitrator so finds.

June 26, 1987
ERIC/J. SCHMERTZ
ARBITRATOR
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The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer violate Article XII B of the
collective bargaining agreement by failing to
offer Saturday overtime employment on June 21,
1986 to the following grievants:
Louis Figueroa, Steve Price, Richard
Santana and Robert Donlan?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on December 18, 1986 at which time the
aobve-named grievants and representatives of the above-named
Union and Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Union and Employer filed a post-

hearing brief.
Notwithstanding

the Employer's argument, raised for the first

time in its brief, that the Union is barred from complaining about
the offers of overtime for Saturday, May 10, because it did not
then object or grieve, I am satisfied that during the course of
the hearing, both sides recognized the materiality and determinations of the May 10th assignments.
The Union concedes that pursuant to the procedure for Saturday
overtime assignments, if the grievants had been asked to work
overtime on May 10th, and declined or were unavailable to be
asked, they were thereafter properly bypassed for the June 21st
overtime.
The Employer contended at the hearing that the grievants were

-2asked to work the May 10th overtime and declined to do so, or
were not available on the property to be asked.

The Union claimed

to the contrary and thus the issue was joined and narrowed to
this determinative issue of fact.
The probative evidence on this pivotal question supports the
Union.

Each of the grievants testified under oath that they were

not asked to work the May 10th overtime, and hence did not decline
and should have remained at the top of the relevant seniority
list for the next Saturday overtime assignment on June 21st.
The Employer's evidence to the contrary was hearsay in nature,
and thus not as probative or persuasive.

The Employer's super-

intendent testified that he was told by the foreman that the grievants were asked and declined or were not present to be asked.
The foreman did not testify.
As between the direct testimony of the grievants and the
testimony of the superintendent which was not based on his own
knowledge, and without any evidence to cause me to disbelieve the
grievants, their testimony must be credited as acceptable.
Accordingly, the grievants remained eligible for the next
overtime available to their classifications - on June 21st.

As

the Employer gave the overtime on Saturday, June 21st to two
different employees lower on the eligible overtime list than the
grievants, the two grievants with the higher positions on the list
at that time shall be paid and made whole in the amount they would
have earned had they been offered and worked the overtime on June
21st.

The remaining grievants shall retain their eligibility as

of May 10th, and therefore shall be accorded top priority for the
next Saturday overtime consistent with their classifications.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and having

-3-

been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Employer violated Article XII B of the
collective bargaining agreement by failing
to offer Saturday overtime employment on
June 21st, 1986 to the grievants.
The Employer shall pay to the two grievants
with the higher positions on the overtime
lists as of May 10, 1986 an amount equal to
what they would have earned had they been
offered and worked the overtime assignment
on June 21, 1986.
The remaining grievants shall retain their
eligibility for Saturday overtime as of May
10th, 1986 and shall therefore be accorded
top priority for the next future Saturday
overtime consistent with their classification.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 20, 1987
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) "
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

